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AGAINST NEOREHABILITATION
Jessica M. Eaglin*
ABSTRACT
In the face of severe budget constraints,bipartisancalls for reform, dropping crime rates, and judicial intervention, states are seriously considering
and implementing criminal justice reform to manage prison populations
for the first time in three decades. Scholars agree that states need a guiding
theory to transform emergency and short-term reforms into a long-term
shift in policy and practice away from mass incarceration. Numerous
scholars advocate for a return to an improved theory of rehabilitationto
guide the states in implementing such reform. This return-through neorehabilitation,or the rehabilitationof rehabilitation-centerson the use of
evidence-based programming and predictive tools to create a rehabilitative
model that "works."
Despite the intriguingnature of this new rehabilitativemodel, this Article
challenges this general shift in scholarly and practical reform. It argues that
the problem of mass incarcerationcannot be resolved through a return to
this particularform of rehabilitation,no matter how "improved" it may be.
To that end, this Article demonstrates that current rehabilitation-guided
sentencing reforms-with their emphasis on evidence-based programming
and the use of predictive tools-have several inherent flaws that will limit
the efforts to downsize prison populations beyond mere budget-cut crises.
Specifically, the neorehabilitativemodel stands to institutionalize a focus
on the wrong offenders, exacerbate racial disparities,and distort our perception of justice. Moreover, this new rehabilitationmodel fails to provide
a sufficiently different theory of reform from total incapacitation, which
grew out of the desire to improve rehabilitation.For these reasons, this
Article argues that the neorehabilitative model is a dangerous theory of
reform as states shift towards broader and long-term sentencing policies.
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man loses his keys near his car in the dark of night. A friend
finds the man looking for the keys under a street lamp yards
away from his car. When the friend asks why the man is looking
for his keys in that location, the man says, "Because that's where the light
is.",1
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, more than half of the states are considering implementing or
are implementing some type of criminal justice reform to downsize their
prison populations. 2 In the face of dropping crime rates,3 budget con1. This common analogy is used in various stories and articles. Bernard Harcourt uses
the analogy to describe the shift towards the actuarial in punishment. See BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHMENT IN AN AcruARIAL AGE 193 (2007) (citing Carol Steiker). This Article will demonstrate that reforms

guided by the neorehabilitative-model are similar to the man looking for his keys under the
street lamp far from his car: well-intentioned but potentially illogical and unhelpful to
resolving the larger problems driving mass incarceration in the United States.
2. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2011:
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 2-4 (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.

org/doc/publications/publications/sen Stateof Sentencing 2011.pdf. In 2011 alone, eighteen "states adopted sentencing policy measures to manage state prison populations." Id.
at 4.
3. Since 1990, the national murder rate fell by half, and the violent and property
crime rates have dropped considerably. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, HEARING ON FEDERAL SENTENCING

OPTIONS

AFTER BOOKER: CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING

BEFORE THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION (2012) (statement of Matthew Axelrod, Asso-

ciate Deputy Attorney General), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and_Public_
Affairs/PublicHearings-andMeetings/20120215-16/Testimony_16 Axelrod.pdf. The decreasing crime rate incentivizes states to downsize their prison populations by "draining
the political potency from crime fears" to unquestioningly support policy decisions to mass
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straints, 4 bipartisan calls for reform, 5 and judicial encouragement through
recent Supreme Court decisions, 6 many states are now forced to reconsider the punitive policies that have expanded the carceral states of
America and created the phenomenon of mass incarceration. 7
A growing body of scholarship discusses the emergency sentencing reforms that several states have undertaken to alleviate their increasing
prison populations.8 These emergency reforms lack theoretical guidance
incarcerate large swaths of the prison population. Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh
Sentences Catches On in Conservative States, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 2011, at A14.
4. Mass incarceration is undeniably expensive. In 2008, the cost of corrections in the
United States was $52 billion; the states accounted for $47 billion of that expense. PEW
CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 11
(2009). For a comprehensive explanation on why the states, rather than the federal government, are pressured to reconsider the punitive policies leading to mass incarceration as a
result of growing fiscal constraints, see Rachel E. Barkow, Panel Four: The Institutional
Concerns Inherent in Sentencing Regimes: Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105
COLuM. L. REV. 1276, 1305-06 (2005), noting that the federal government has more fiscal
leeway in spending than the states, whose budgets are finite and must be balanced each
year. This distinction becomes increasingly less meaningful with the additional budgetary
pressures recently placed on the federal criminal justice system through sequestration. See,
e.g., Andrew Cohen, How the Sequester Threatens the U.S. Legal System, THE ATLANTIC,
Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/how-the-sequesterthreatens-the-us-legal-system/273878/.
5. In recent years, both Republicans and Democrats have called for criminal justice
reform, particularly in the area of sentencing. Conservative groups like "Right on Crime"
have increasingly influenced sentencing reform in various states, particularly in conservative and tough-on-crime states like Texas. See Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Prison Reform:
A Smart Way for States to Save Money and Lives, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010604386.html; RIGHT ON
CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2012); see also ACLU, SMART
REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES (2011), availableat http://www.aclu.org/files/assests/smartreformispossible web.pdf.
6. In 2010, the Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to impose life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile nonhomicide criminal offenders. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). Though this decision did not reduce the prison
population by any significant number, the 6-3 decision signaled a shift in the Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and a turn away from judicial deference to the
legislature regarding the imposition of punishment. See id. at 2035-36, 2043. More significantly, in 2011 the Supreme Court affirmed an order requiring California to reduce its state
prison population by 38,000 to 46,000 prisoners over the course of two years in response to
the state's persistent prison overcrowding. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928, 1947
(2011). The Supreme Court justified the decision under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, concluding that the overcrowded prisons prevented the
state of California from providing constitutionally required medical and mental health care
to its state prisoners. Id. at 1947.
7. David Garland describes mass imprisonment as a social phenomenon in the
United States defined by both the sheer size of the U.S. prison population and its concentrated effect on poor black males in urban centers. David Garland, Introduction: The
Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1-2 (David Garland ed., 2001). Scholars have subsequently used the terms "mass
imprisonment" and "mass incarceration" interchangeably. This Article uses the term "mass
incarceration" because of its growing popularity outside of legal scholarship, particularly
with grassroot organizations. See, e.g., THE SToP MASS INCARCERATION NETWORK, http://
www.stopmassincarceration.org/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012).
8. See, e.g., JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DowNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 1-4 (2010), available at http://www.
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc DownscalingPrisons20lO.pdf.;
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and thus are in danger of incoherence and temporality. In recent years,
several "[s]tates have enacted a slew of penal reforms aimed at shrinking
their state prison populations" in response to the crushing economic burdens of mass incarceration. 9 Nevertheless, most leading scholars refuse to
recognize a theoretical shift in policy reform. Professor Michael M.
O'Hear, for example, acknowledges that these emergency reforms reflect
an "apparent disconnect" with the leading theory of penal reform advocated by the American Law Institute-limiting retributivism' 0-but nevertheless argues that such emergency policies can be incorporated into
current practice." He does not, however, argue that they have been incorporated into the theoretical framework.1 2 Moreover, Professor Marie
Gottschalk raises a red flag to these emergency reforms, arguing that the
economic pressures to downsize state prison populations may in fact result in more punitive policies-as opposed to softened punishment-during hard times.' 3 At the same time, several advocates and scholars have
endorsed the expansion of rehabilitation-focused reforms, most notably
drug courts, as a method to manage prison populations and divert lowlevel offenders from unnecessary and expensive incarceration terms.14
Thus, tension exists within legal scholarship regarding not only how states
should endeavor to manage their prison populations but also which methods are best at implementing reforms that address the political and economic behemoth of overincarceration in the United States.' 5 Legal
scholars grapple with providing states with both guiding theories of reform to manage their prison populations and frameworks to transform
Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 581 (2012); Marie Gottschalk, Cell Blocks & Red Ink: Mass Incarceration,the Great
Recession & Penal Reform, DaeDALUS, Summer 2010, at 62; Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration:Lessons from the Deinstitutionalizationof Mental Hospitals in the
1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53 (2011); Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without
Hiding the Truth: JudicialSentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release,
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465 (2010) [hereinafter Klingele, JudicialSentence Modification];
Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415 (2012) [hereinafter Klingele, Early Demise]; see also MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: How
To REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2005).
9. Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 62-63.
10. Limiting retributivism is a theory of punishment advocated by several leading sentencing scholars, including Michael M. O'Hear and Kevin R. Reitz. See Michael M.
O'Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation:A New Theory of IndeterminateSentencing, 48 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1247, 1247, 1251 (2011); Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal
Code: Sentencing, Planfor Revision, 6 Bure. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 528-29 (2002). The basis
of the theory is that the outer limits of punishment are measures of blameworthinessretribution-but that the actual sentence an individual receives may be influenced by other
theories of punishment, including rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. See
O'Hear, supra, at 1259.

11. O'Hear, supra note 10, at 1250-51 (recognizing an "apparent disconnect" between
theorists and policymakers in implementing sentencing reform).
12. Id. at 1252.
13. Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 63.
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See Allegra M. McLeod, DecarcerationCourts: Possibilitiesand Perils of a Shifting
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587,1589-90,1644-57 (2012) (recognizing the growing pressures to decarcerate, then discussing several competing theoretical models for specialized
courts potentially aimed to reduce incarceration levels).
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successful short-term emergency responses into long-lasting and permanent sentencing policies.16
This Article intervenes at the intersection of these two debates. It identifies and critiques the expansion of the neorehabilitative model of sentencing reform as states attempt to manage their prison populations. It
does so by demonstrating that this new rehabilitative model is present in
several leading emergency sentencing reforms adopted in response to the
political and economic pressures to manage state prison populations. Rehabilitation, once the leading penal theory of reform in the United States,
fell into disrepute in the 1970s as states shifted towards more punitive
models of criminal justice.' 7 In the wake of this shift, states adopted a
more punitive theory of total incapacitation, and the prison population
swelled.' 8 Today, several advocates and scholars are calling for a return to
rehabilitation once more.19 The neorehabilitative theory, however, has
been modified to avoid the shortcomings of the old rehabilitative model.
Scholars and advocates now emphasize evidence-based rehabilitative programming that proves its efficacy and cost efficiency. 20 At the same time,
several scholars advocate the use of predictive tools to further increase
the likelihood of successful early release and rehabilitative programming.2 1 These reforms represent a shift towards penal policies aimed at
16. Fan, supra note 8, at 633 (recognizing that "[rlelease-value reforms are often practice in need of theory" and arguing for a new theory of rehabilitation to guide reform);
McLeod, supra note 15, O'Hear,supra note 10, at 1284 (describing a way for the theory of
limiting retributivism to fit into practice of indeterminate sentencing reemerging as states
implement emergency sentencing reform).
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See Francis T. Cullen, The Twelve People Who Saved Rehabilitation:How the Science of Criminology Made a Difference, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (2005) ("Rehabilitation is
making a comeback."); AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW
RECONSTRUCTION 10 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds., 2008) (recognizing that "rehabilitation is back on the table"); Fan, supra note 8, at 653 (advocating for "rehabilitation pragmatism"). But cf O'Hear, supra note 10, at 1250 (acknowledging that the indeterminate
sentencing structure closely tied to the rehabilitative ideal has grown in popularity in recent years, but refusing to go so far as to recognize a theoretical shift towards
rehabilitation).
20. See Fan,supra note 8, at 634 (arguing for the adoption of "rehabilitation pragmatism": a new theory of rehabilitation based in efficacy, cost-effectiveness, and success, unlike the "starry-eyed" and "egalitarian" theory of yesteryear); Joan Petersilia, California's
CorrectionalParadoxof Excess and Deprivation, 37 CRIME AND JUSTICE 207, 207, 270-73
(2008) (arguing that California must adopt evidence-based rehabilitation programs as part
of a six-part plan to manage its exploding prison population); Roger K. Warren, A Tale of
Two Surveys: Judicial and Public Perspectives on State Sentencing Reform, 21 FED. SENT'G
REP. 276, 285 (2009) (recognizing widespread public and judicial support for evidencebased, rehabilitation-focused reform for low-level offenders).
21. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and
Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1395-98 (2011) (endorsing sentencing
reform from a scholarly perspective); Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practicesand State
Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1311
(2007) (endorsing the expansion of actuarial tools in sentencing reform from a practical
perspective); Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public
Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1389, 1404-07 (2008) (describing Missouri's adoption of risk assessment tools into sentencing practices). Cf. Malcolm M.
Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Correc-

194

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

managing prison populations through selective treatment and discipline
while simultaneously focusing on alternatives to incarceration for certain,
supposedly more deserving, offenders.22 This shift is popular both politically and publicly because it emphasizes individual responsibility and risk
management to insulate the state and potentially protect the public from
the perceivedly unmanageable threat of crime in the United States. 23
This Article also argues that this new model of punishment suffers from
several inherent limitations that make this framework a dangerous model
of reform going forward. The Article joins several scholars in identifying
evidence of the new penology in criminal justice reform. 24 It extends previous critiques by locating the new penology in recent emergency sentencing reforms, and it expands on the dangers of its adoption by
identifying three key institutionalized perversions to the criminal justice
system. This Article argues that this new rehabilitative model, particularly
through the expansion of evidence-based programming and predictive
tools, suffers from serious and inherent limitations that may prevent this
theory of reform from guiding states past the current problem of overincarceration in the United States. The neorehabilitative model potentially
focuses on the wrong offenders, 25 exacerbates racial disparities in the
prison populations, 26 and distorts our perception of criminal justice. 27
Moreover, it stands to continue the theoretical underpinnings of total incapacitation, which created the problem of mass incarceration in the first
place. 28 Because neorehabilitation may provide a rhetorical solution to
mass incarceration without providing a significant change in the problematic policies that led us to the current crisis, this Article argues that this
particular theory of rehabilitation should not guide states in their reform
efforts.
To demonstrate the prevalence and limitations of the neorehabilitative
model, this Article focuses on three popular emergency sentencing reforms adopted in several states: early release reform, 2 9 parole revocation
tions and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449-50, 470 (1992) (describing the emergence of new discourses, objectives, and techniques based in predictive tools and costefficiency in the arena of criminal justice reform, but expressing skepticism rather than
endorsement).
22. The focus on risk management through selective treatment is a classic characteristic of the new penology, as identified by Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon. Feeley &
Simon, supra note 21, at 457. The use of treatment in tandem with discipline for certain
offenders, however, is the unique confluence of the neorehabilitative model and the new
penology. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 417, 425 (2009).

25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. See infra Part IV.B.
27. See infra Part IV.C.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See O'Hear,supra note 10, at 1248, 1288 (noting that at least thirty-six states have
reactivated or adopted early release reforms to manage their prison populations).
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reform, 30 and the proliferation of drug courts. 31 These particular changes
demonstrate not only emergency reforms enacted in the face of converging pressures on the states but also the new model of rehabilitation. Thus,
the Article speaks to scholars and policy makers advocating for the expansion of these emergency reforms to manage prison populations. This
Article does not explore the new rehabilitated model of rehabilitation
through the lens of the current prisoner reentry movement. This may
seem surprising because numerous scholars agree that the return of rehabilitation is most prevalent in this context; 32 however, this Article purposefully abstains from entering the discourse on prisoner reentry as a
way to demonstrate the ubiquity of this shift towards neorehabilitation in
criminal justice reform. Though the emergence of a renewed focus on
rehabilitation may be most obvious in the context of reentry,3 3 there is a
broader shift in criminal justice reform that this Article identifies through
the lens of sentencing reform specifically.
The Article unfolds in four parts. Part II identifies the problem of mass
incarceration through the paradigm of the current leading theory of reform, total incapacitation. Part III discusses the general trend towards the
neorehabilitative model of sentencing reform and demonstrates this shift
through a discussion of the three leading types of emergency sentencing
reforms recently adopted by several states: early release reform, parole
revocation reform, and the proliferation of drug courts to divert low-level
drug offenders from incarceration. Part IV lays out the limitations of
framing criminal justice reform through the lens of neorehabilitation. It
addresses three major limitations: focusing on the wrong offenders, exacerbating racial disparities, and distorting our perception of criminal justice. Part V explains the persistence of these inherent limitations by
identifying the link between current neorehabilitation, the new penology,
and total incapacitation theory.
30. See John Schwartz, Report Finds States Holding Fewer Prisoners,N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2010, at A15 ("The most common reform that we're seeing . .. [is] various strategies to
hold parole violators accountable, short of jamming them back into a $25,000-a-year, taxpayer-funded prison cell.").
31. Warren, supra note 20, at 277 (recognizing that a 2006 National Center for State
Courts report identified "[e]xpand[ed] . . . use of drug courts, problem-solving courts, and
evidence-based practices . . . as being among the leading current sentencing reform efforts
in the states.").
32. See, e.g., Jessica S. Henry, The Second Chance Act of 2007, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 416,
419 (2009) (noting that rehabilitative efforts now focus upon reentry); Michelle S. Phelps,
Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in U.S. Prison
Programs,45 LAw & Soc'v REV. 33, 55 (2011) (concluding after review of empirical work
that "to whatever extent 'rehabilitation is back on the table,' it is on the table in a new
format increasingly focused on [prisoner reentry initiatives]"). Cf Michael M. O'Hear, The
Second Chance Act and the Future of Reentry Reform, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 75, 75, 81-82
(2007) (recognizing the growing focus on the prisoner reentry reform movement and its
impact on criminal justice reform more broadly).
33. This Article does not address the reentry movement; thus the author does not
opine on whether neorehabilitation-with its focus on cost-efficiency, predictive tools, risk
management, and individual responsibility-has the same deleterious effects on the reentry movement as those identified here in the sentencing reform context. See infra Part III.
This issue will be explored in a future article.
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TOTAL INCAPACITATION

The United States leads the world in its rate of incarceration. 34 This
figure is the direct result of punitive sentencing policies. Beginning in the
1970s, a wave of tough-on-crime policies spread across the United States
as the states and the federal government moved away from the rehabilitative model towards an incapacitation-focused model of punishment. The
most notable manifestation of this shift is the abandonment of indeterminate sentencing systems in favor of determinate, punitive sentencing
practices. At the same time, politicians passed truth-in-sentencing policies, habitual offender laws, and tough mandatory minimum sentences for
a broad scope of crimes. These reforms resulted in a severe and rapid
increase in the U.S. prison population.35 By 2010, one in every ninetynine persons in the United States was incarcerated.3 6 Though these numbers have stabilized and even decreased slightly in recent years, the
United States continues to maintain its distinction as the most punitive
country in the world. 37
The guiding theory of reform during the past three decades is best
characterized as incapacitation.3 8 Where the rehabilitative model of pun34. In 2010, the United States incarcerated at a rate of 731 persons per every 100,000
adult citizens. LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 7 tbl.2 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf. This rate of incarceration is particularly egregious when compared to similar Western or Capitalist economies. See Nicola Lacey, American Imprisonment in ComparativePerspective, DeDALUS, Summer 2010, at 102, 103 fig.1 (demonstrating
that the United States incarcerated at a rate nearly four times that of the closest neoliberal
market economy-New Zealand-in 2008). Even accounting for the recent dip in the rate
of incarceration, the United States continues to outstrip comparable countries. See GLAZE,
supra, at 1; Lacey, supra, at 103 Fig. 1.
35. Between 1970 and 2010, the prison population in the United States quadrupled.
Mark Engler, America: Life in PrisonNation, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Oct. 2011, at 53. In
1970, state and federal prisons housed fewer than 200,000 inmates, and the prison population had been relatively stable over the past fifty years. Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T.
Cullen, The Effectiveness of CorrectionalRehabilitation:A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3
ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 297, 298 (2007). The prison population has increased exponentially in recent decades, and today nearly 2.3 million people are incarcerated in state and
federal prisons around the United States. GLAZE, supra note 34, at 2.
36. Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1413, 1493 (2010).
37. Id. at 1492. In 2010, the combined U.S. prison population decreased for the first
time since 1972. PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010 1
(2011). Additionally, the number of incarcerated persons declined by 0.3% in 2010. Id. This
number becomes even more significant when considering the state prison population separate from the federal system. Although the federal prison population increased by 0.8% in
2010, the state prison population decreased by 0.5%. Id. Scholars are hesitant to rejoice in
this slight decrease, speculating whether the decline indicates a broader trend towards reducing prisoners or simply represents a brief aberration. See Gottschalk, supra note 8;
Marc Mauer, Sentencing Reform: Amid Mass Incarceration-GuardedOptimism, 26 CRIM.
JUST. 27 (2011). This Article intervenes into this discourse by asserting that several recent
efforts leading to states' downsized populations are not at this point long-term reform sufficient to make a permanent change in the prison populations.
38. While there was a brief period in the 1980s where retribution and deterrence best
characterized criminal justice reform, the leading theory since the 1990s has been incapacitation. See Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 452, 452 (1998).

2013]1

Against Neorehabilitation

197

ishment centered on incarcerating individuals until they were prepared to
reenter society as productive citizens, 39 incapacitation focuses on incarcerating criminal offenders for the longest period possible to reduce the
risk to public safety of reoffending. 4 0 Jonathan Simon defines the current
penal theory as "total incapacitation," a more extreme version of incapacitation theory.4 1 As he explains, "total incapacitation" hinges on "the idea
that imprisonment is appropriate whenever an offender poses any degree
of risk to the community," to the exclusion of alternative methods of addressing an offense. 42
Total incapacitation finds its roots in what Professors Jonathan Simon
and Malcolm Feeley have identified as the "new penology" of crime. 43
First introduced in 1992, this theory of punishment focuses on risk management, aggregation of subpopulations, the rise of the actuarial methods, and "populist punitiveness." 4 4 Though the new penology cuts across
the four traditional purposes of punishment, it resonates most with the
theory of incapacitation. 45 Incapacitation removes offenders from society,
and the new penology approaches crime as something permanent and unpreventable. 46 Thus, incapacitation is the only way to defer the commission of crime, and total incapacitation endeavors to defer the future
recommission of crime for the longest possible period by the most likely
offenders, which is seen as inevitable.
The best representation of the new penology theory is the proliferation
of truth-in-sentencing policies, 47 habitual offender laws, 4 8 and mandatory
39. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1989).
40. Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 259, 271-72 (2011) (recognizing that the theory of incapacitation has "taken
center stage in recent years"). There are, of course, limitations to how long an offender
may be incarcerated for an offense. The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to include a proportionality review of criminal sentences. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2021 (2010). Additionally, the parsimony principle in sentencing encourages the shortest
term of incarceration necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 904 (10th Cir. 2008). These principles, however, have been
interpreted narrowly to provide very limited protection against increasingly longer and
more severe sentences. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991). The Eighth
Amendment's "narrow proportionality principle," for example, "forbids only extreme
sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Id. at 997, 1001. It remains to be
seen whether the Supreme Court's recent decision in Graham will breathe new life into the
proportionality review outside the context of nonhomicide juvenile offenders.
41. Jonathan Simon, Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v. Florida to
Abolition of Life Without Parole, in LWE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEw DEATH

282, 293 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) [hereinafter LIFE
WIHOUT PAROLE].
42. Id.
43. Feeley & Simon, supra note 21, at 458.
44. See id. at 450; Simon, supra note 38, at 452-55.
45. Simon, supra note 38, at 452, 455.
46. See Feeley & Simon, supra note 21, at 452.
47. See Fan,supra note 8, at 589-90.
48. The typical examples of habitual offender laws are the "three strikes" laws that
proliferated throughout the United States in the 1990s. See Scott A. Grosskreutz, Strike
Three: Even Though California's Three Strikes Law Strikes Out Andrade, There Are No
Winners in this Game [Lockyer v. Andrade, 583 U.S. 63 (2003)], 43 WASHBURN L.J. 429,
455 (2004).
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minimum sentences designed to extend prisoners' terms of incarceration. 49 California's three-strikes law, one of the most draconian habitual
offender laws in the country, resulted in a severe increase in the state's
prison population.50 Today more than five percent of all state prisoners in
California are sentenced to life under this law. 5' In 2010, more than forty
percent of California's third-strike population was serving life for a nonviolent, nonserious offense due to the broad scope of the statute. 52 But
total incapacitation signifies more than simply the passage of several laws
in the 1980s-1990s; this theory captures a larger shift towards excluding
criminal offenders from society in any way possible. The expansion of
collateral consequences and the reduction in grants of parole to even
those offenders qualified for release further illustrate the theory of total
incapacitation.5 3
49. Mandatory minimums increase the minimum punishment an offender can receive
for conviction of certain crimes with particular characteristics. For example, several states
have mandatory minimum terms of incarceration that must be served for all offenders
convicted of possessing more than a certain amount of a particular drug. Christopher Mascharka, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying the Law of Unintended
Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 936 (2001). Additionally, an offender may receive a legislatively mandated minimum term of incarceration for possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2011),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative andPublicAffairs/Congressional-Testimony-andReports/MandatoryMinimumPenalties/20111031_RtCMandatoryMinimum.cfm. Such characteristics of the crime trigger the mandatory minimum term of
punishment, thus creating a higher floor from which the trial judge must decide the appropriate sentence. See id. In some cases, these legislatively mandated minimum terms of punishment push an offender to the maximum statutory punishment permissible for the
original crime of conviction. See Blakeley v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-05, 308 (2004)
(invalidating determinate state sentence where judicial fact-finding created a mandatory
minimum in excess of the maximum statutory term of imprisonment for the crime of conviction); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 259 (2005) (rendering the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines advisory for the same reason).
50. Bettye Miller, Three-Strikes Law Fails to Reduce Crime, UCR TODAY (Feb. 28,
2012), http://ucrtoday.ucr.edu/3557.
51. In 2010, when the prison population amounted to nearly 160,000 prisoners, the
total three-strikes population was estimated at 8,500 prisoners. GUERINO ET AL., supra
note 37, at 14 tbl.1; Emily Bazelon, Arguing Three Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at
MM40.
52. Bazelon, supra note 51. California's three-strikes statute is particularly harsh in
application. While the first and second offense must be "violent" or "serious," CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(c)(7) (West 2010), the term "serious" is construed broadly enough to include
criminal offenses not typically considered violent or serious. See Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 15-17 (2003) (explaining "wobbler" offenses, which may be considered felonies or
misdemeanors depending upon an offender's criminal history or other factors). There are
numerous examples of the perversity of this statute in application. For example, Leandro
Andrade received a three-strikes life sentence for shoplifting videotapes adding up to less
than $150 in value. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 68 (2003). Gary Ewing received a
life sentence for shoplifting three golf clubs. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 17-18, 20. The Supreme
Court upheld these convictions against Eighth Amendment challenges because the state
legislature was arguably meeting a legitimate purpose of punishment in implementing
those offenses: incapacitation. Id. at 20, 24-25, 30 (explaining that the Court deferred to
the legislature's policy decision that some repeat offenders "must be isolated from society
in order to protect the public safety"); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77.
53. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 4, at 19 (noting that many policy makers
have "embraced longer sentences through broadly defined 'three strikes' statutes and pa-
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Despite the dominance of incapacitation as the leading penal theory,
some of the punitive policies that drove the problem of mass incarceration have been placed into doubt in recent years. States are now at the
point where they cannot afford to incarcerate at the rates they have
reached in the past three decades. 54 Moreover, data suggests that the size
of the incarcerated population in the United States has reached the "tipping point" whereby more incarceration no longer reduces crime rates,55
and in fact it may be criminogenic. 56 As a result, politicians, advocates,
and scholars alike have called for and implemented several sentencing
reforms driven by the need to reconsider the policies behind incarceration.57 These reforms can be characterized as a return to the guiding theory of rehabilitation. The following Part will discuss these emergency
reforms in the context of a broader growing shift in criminal justice reform towards neorehabilitation.
III.

NEOREHABILITATION AND EMERGENCY
SENTENCING REFORMS

The premise of the original theory of rehabilitation was the belief that
every criminal offender should be released from prison when he or she
has been treated for the illness of criminality and can reenter society as a
meaningful and law-abiding citizen. For the majority of the twentieth century, this theory of rehabilitation dominated state and federal sentencing
systems in the United States.5 8 However, beginning in the 1970s, both the
role policies that are hiking up the average age of inmates"); Sharon Dolovich, Creating the
PermanentPrisoner,in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 41, at 96, 116 (observing that
the breadth of collateral consequences in the United States demonstrates a commitment to
an exclusionary penal theory). Cf

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 137-41 (2010) (noting collateral conse-

quences as part of a broader project to exclude portions of society).
54. See Fan,supra note 8, at 595-96; Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 62 (quoting Attorney
General Eric Holder's 2009 statement that the country's extraordinary incarceration rate is
economically unsustainable); Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 8, at 422. See generally
supra notes 2-5.
55. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 4, at 18-20 (summarizing scholarly data and
concluding that "[m]any states appear to have reached a 'tipping point' where additional
incarceration will have little if any effect on crime").
56. Id. at 19. This is particularly true for nonviolent offenders and drug offenders. Fan,
supra note 8, at 594-95.
57. See infra Part III.
58. Under the rehabilitative model of indeterminate sentencing, the trial court had
wide discretion to select a prison sentence for criminal offenders with mild limitations from
broad legislatively imposed statutory ranges. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
363-64 (1989) (describing indeterminate sentencing under the rehabilitative model in the
federal system). Once offenders spent a third of their prison terms incarcerated, the authority shifted to back-end players, like parole boards or correctional officers, to determine
whether they should be released. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 226-27 (1995). When offenders were released from prison, it was because they
were rehabilitated, as determined by a parole board. See id. at 227. Thus, the judge imposed an indeterminate sentence with a term of incarceration, but the parole board determined the precise moment when-due to programming, good behavior, and other
factors-an offender would be released from prison. See id.
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left and the right attacked the rehabilitative model of punishment. 59 On
the left, critics argued that rehabilitation was unjust, arbitrary, and racially discriminatory. 60 On the right, tough-on-crime lawmakers argued
that this theory led to indeterminate sentences that were too uncertain
and lenient to actually deter criminal offending. 61
In the wake of Robert Martinson's influential essay What WorksQuestions and Answers About Prison Reform, critics from both the left
and the right supported the eradication of the rehabilitative model of
punishment. Martinson's essay asserted that offender rehabilitation programs failed to reduce recidivism. 62 Though Martinson later recanted and
revised his perspective on rehabilitative programming, 63 the damage was
done. As scholars and activists called for a reform of sentencing laws in
this country, politicians agreed that the rehabilitative model was unsuccessful and that determinate sentences were more favorable. 64 Though
numerous states maintained indeterminate sentencing systems over the
following three decades, 65 the rehabilitative model of punishment
declined. 66
Even as the decline of the rehabilitative model intensified, several
scholars have attempted to "rehabilitate" the dying model, defending the
59. Several sociopolitical events converged to bring an end to the rehabilitative model
of punishment, along with the critiques discussed in the following footnotes. These include
backlash to the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and the politicization of crime.
See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do With It? The Political,Social, Psychologicaland
Other Non-Legal FactorsInfluencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 33-36 (1997); Phelps, supra note 32, at 37 (describing Francis Allen's
argument that events like Vietnam, Hiroshima, and the Watergate scandal "reduced confidence in the malleability of human nature"); Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash:Race and the
Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230 (2007) (describing
punitive crime policies as a negative response to the civil rights movement). While outside
the scope of this Article's critique of rehabilitation, it is important to recognize that the
shift away from the rehabilitative model was influenced greatly by broader social forces as
well.
60. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT ORDER 21-25
(1973); Stith & Koh, supra note 58, at 227 (arguing that sentences were allegedly racially
discriminatory because judges had unlimited discretion to sentence based on their own
views of the offender); see also TASK FORCE ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 50-57 (1967) (discussing threats to justice caused by prejudice).

61. See Stith & Koh, supra note 58, at 277; see also Dhammika Dharmapala et al.,
Legislatures, Judges, and Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate
Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1037, 1040 (2010).
62. See Robert Martinson, What Works-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 Pun. INT. 22, 28 (1974).
63. Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 252-54 (1979) (withdrawing his conclusion that
nothing works).
64. See Stith & Koh, supra note 58, at 277-78.
65. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and ConstitutionalLaw at
Cross-Purposes,105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1103 n.79 (2005) (noting that "[i]ndeterminate
systems remain in use in nearly half of all states, including New York, Alabama, Iowa, and
Texas").
66. See Phelps, supra note 32, at 33.
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theory through empirical studies. 67 Although scholars are skeptical of
Martinson's conclusion that "nothing works," there is a general consensus
that rehabilitative programming reduces recidivism but does not eradicate it.68 Indeed, the promising findings of many studies indicate that results are offense-specific and offender-specific. 69 Consequently, scholars
and advocates have attempted to identify those offenders who are most
suited to receive rehabilitative programming, be released early, or both. 70
Neorehabilitation emerged with the advent of drug courts in the late
1980s.71 Witnessing the way in which drug addictions kept low-level offenders perpetually cycling in and out of the justice system, courts sought
to both divert offenders and provide treatment for the underlying cause
of their reappearances. 72 This led to a rehabilitative-focused revolution in
the criminal justice system. 7 3 But neorehabilitation is not like the old rehabilitative model. Its purpose is to manage criminal offenders more efficiently and effectively, at times through treatment rather than
incarceration. 74 Unlike the old rehabilitative model, neorehabilitation
does not merely seek to improve the offender,75 but to manage the risk of
recidivism through responsibilization and the use of particular tools to
improve treatment and reduce the likelihood of future crime. 76 Neorehabilitation thus identifies and manages offenders through treatment
for the benefit of society, not the individual. This societal benefit makes
neorehabilitation particularly appealing as a bipartisan platform for re67. See Rachel E. Barkow, Life without Parole and the Hope for Real Sentencing Reform, in Ln'E WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 41, at 190, 199 & n.63; Lipsey & Cullen, supra
note 35, at 298.
68. See Barkow, supra note 67, at 199 (noting that "while certain treatments (either
alone or in combination) lower rates of recidivism, recidivism remains relatively high even
after treatment"); Lipsey & Cullen, supra note 35, at 303 & tbl.2 (finding that all studies on
the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs demonstrate between a 10% and 40% average
reduction in recidivism).
69. Barkow, supra note 67, at 199. Studies suggest that rehabilitation programming has
the largest effect on juvenile offenders, though no studies have compared effectiveness
between juveniles and adults, Lipsey & Cullen, supra note 35, at 304. Still, comparing different types of treatments while controlling for age group demonstrates that no particular
treatment program can be defined as effective consistently, suggesting that treatment success varies for different offenders and different offenses. See id. at 309-310.
70. Lipsey & Cullen, supra note 35, at 306 ("The most important challenge for contemporary rehabilitation research is to identify the factors that most influence the likelihood of positive treatment effects.").
71. See infra Part III.C and notes 125-26. Professor Eric Miller first used the phrase
"neorehabilitation" in his 2009 article critiquing the ways in which the therapeutic model
of drug courts obscures the racialized social forces that drive the overcriminalization of
drug offenders. Miller, supra note 24, at 441. Several other scholars have since used the
term in relation to drug court reform. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 15, at 1595. This Article expands the term neorehabilitation beyond the framework of therapeutic jurisprudence
and drug courts to a broader model of criminal justice reform.
72. Miller, supra note 24, at 417.
73. McLeod, supra note 15, at 1591 (recognizing that some commentators believe
"specialized criminal courts ... facilitat[ed] 'a quiet revolution among American criminal
courts"' and created "a new 'criminal justice paradigm"').
74. See Miller, supra note 24, at 439-40.
75. See id. at 439.
76. See id. at 437.
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form because the services that an offender may receive are framed within
the language of individual responsibility, permanent criminal risk, and
risk management.7 7
Central to neorehabilitation is the contribution of evidence-based programs and risk assessment tools to inform penal and sentencing policies.78
Social science research and empirical evidence testify to the success of
evidence-based programs in reducing recidivism. 79 Risk assessment tools
are predictive models that assist parole boards, correctional officers, and
sometimes judges to predict which offenders are most likely to recidivate
and thus inform decisions on which sanctions and what programs are appropriate for the offenders to prevent them from recidivating.8 0 Combined, these two tools are referred to as "the actuarial methods" or, more
generally, "the actuarial." 8' The increased use of these resources arguably
rehabilitates rehabilitation: It prevents the theory from falling prey to the
criticisms launched against rehabilitation in the 1960s through 1970s that
led to its national demise. 82
In recent years, some form of rehabilitation has become more appealing as states struggle with converging pressures demanding the management of their prison populations. As states struggle to cope with the
inevitable human and economic expenses of total incapacitation, scholars
recognize that rehabilitation is at least "back on the table."8 3 Policy makers have recently shown interest in rehabilitative-focused programming
and reform as well." Similarly, surveys indicate that the public would
77. See id. at 427-28.
78. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 8, at 633-34 ("This evidence-based approach [to rehabilitation] diminishes the opacity and seemingly unfettered discretion besieged by critics on
the left and right during the heyday of the rehabilitative ideal.").
79. Lipsey and Cullen define an evidence-based perspective on corrections as one in
which "offender interventions are evaluated and adopted only if they prove to inhibit criminal behavior." Lipsey & Cullen, supra note 35, at 298. While correctional sanctions and
rehabilitative treatment are distinguishable in the sense that the rehabilitative treatment
need not be provided along with a correctional sanction, the evidence-based perspective
for both is the same: reducing recidivism. See id. at 302.
80. See Wolff, supra note 21, at 1405. For example, Missouri uses a risk assessment tool
to distinguish between inmates who can be safely paroled and those who need to stay
behind bars. Id. at 1404-05; see PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE
POPULATION DECLINES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS 6 (2010), available at http://www.
pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing-and-corrections/
PrisonCount_2010.pdf; see also Fan, supra note 8, at 639 (describing how evidence-based
rehabilitative programs use risk assessment tools to screen offenders and determine which
offenders are eligible for parole and early release).
81. Harcourt defines the actuarial methods as those that use statistical methodsrather than clinical methods-on large datasets of criminal offending rates in order to determine the different levels of offending associated with a group or with one or more group
traits and, on the basis of those correlations, to predict the past, present, or future criminal
behavior of a particular person and to administer a criminal justice outcome for that individual. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 16.
82. See Fan, supra note 8, at 633.
83. See AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 19, at 10.
84. For example, recent statements include those of Rick Perry, Governor of Texas ("I
believe we can take an approach to crime that is both tough and smart. . . . [T]here are
thousands of non-violent offenders in the system whose future we cannot ignore. Let's
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prefer to spend tax dollars on rehabilitation, not prisons.8 5 Thus, there is
a general consensus that it is worth investing in rehabilitation-so long as
it works. At the same time, the disappearance of the welfare state and the
social safety net make the neorehabilitative model all the more intriguing
to the public, policy makers, and the judiciary because neorehabilitation
potentially provides otherwise inaccessible services to overwhelmingly
poor subpopulations. 86
The following subsections provide examples of recent emergency reforms that states have implemented to manage their prison populations.
These emergency reforms also represent the growing trend towards
adopting neorehabilitative sentencing policies. Although several of the
state reforms discussed below are the result of cataclysmic incentives to
reduce their state prison populations, they also reflect the scattered and
unguided responses that many states have implemented or are considering implementing as a means to address short-term pressures to reduce
their prison populations.8 7
A.

EARLY RELEASE REFORM

In the face of converging pressures to manage prison populations, numerous states have abandoned in part or in full the truth-in-sentencing
policies that partially contributed to their exploding prison populations.88
At least thirty-six states have reactivated or created early release programs designed to identify and prepare prisoners for release before the
focus more resources on rehabilitating those offenders so we can ultimately spend less
money locking them up again."); Tom Coburn, U.S. Senator from Oklahoma ("As a physician, I believe that we ought to be doing drug treatment rather than incarceration."); and
Eli Lehrer, The Heritage Foundation ("Conservatives should support four policies: improved follow-up, better drug treatment, in-prison work programs, and faith-based rehabilitation."). What ConservativesAre Saying, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/
the-conservative-case-for-reform/what-conservatives-are-saying/ (last visited July 23, 2012).
85. See Warren, supra note 20, at 280 (reporting that seventy-nine percent of respondents surveyed by the National Center for State Courts believed that "many offenders can
turn their lives around" through rehabilitation).
86. See Miller, supra note 24, at 425-27 (recognizing the bipartisan appeal of drug
courts but challenging their benefit to poor and minority communities).
87. There is reason to believe these pressures are short term, at least for most states.
Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 70-71; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 14 (dismissing
states' efforts to downsize prison populations as a means to address the racial subordination aspect of mass incarceration because it does not represent long-term policy reform).
88. Truth-in-sentencing policies-otherwise known as the adoption of determinate
sentencing systems in which prisoners serve at least 85% of their prison sentence-cannot
be solely blamed for the exponential increase in state prison populations. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 13704(a) (2006) (incentivizing states to adopt truth-in-sentencing policies). While
this sentencing structure ascended in the United States at the same time that the prison
population exploded, other sentencing policies enacted into law during this period, such as
mandatory minimums and habitual offender laws, increased the length of sentences. Reitz,
supra note 65, at 1103-04; Ben Trachtenberg, Note, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison
Admissions, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 479, 487-89 (2005). The reinstitution or adoption of
early release reform policies, however, directly contradicts truth-in-sentencing policies as it
reduces the length of an imposed sentence served by a prisoner.

204

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

completion of their sentences.8 9 Prevalent examples of these programs
include the expansion of "earned time" or "good-time" programs, 90 the
expansion or reinstatement of parole eligibility, 9 ' and the enactment of
"compassionate releases." 92 Though these programs are not without criticism and public failures,93 states have relied heavily on such measures to
manage their prison populations and correctional costs over the course of
the past decade. 94
The state of Washington provides an excellent example of the implementation of early release reform based on the neorehabilitative framework. In 2003, it passed reforms that allowed specified prisoners to
reduce their sentences by up to fifty percent through participation in
prison rehabilitation programs. 95 Previously, prisoners could only reduce
their sentences by up to thirty-three percent.9 6 The new law applied to
low-risk, nonviolent offenders as determined by state-validated risk-assessment tools. 9 7 On average, Washington prisoners participating in the
program reduced their prison stays by sixty-three days. 98 The Washington
legislature allowed the reform to sunset in 2010 without renewal. 99 State
legislators have considered alternative cost-saving measures to manage
Washington's offender population since 2010.100 Notably, a Senate subcommittee proposed a bill that would reduce most prisoners' sentences
by 60 to 120 days depending upon their risk classification. 101 The provi89. See supra note 29. For a more detailed account of early release reform, see
Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 8, at 417-20, noting that early release from prison was
the rule, not the exception, under the indeterminate sentencing systems that were widespread in the United States until the late 1970s.
90. O'Hear, supra note 10, at 1275.
91. See W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
395, 398-99 (2011) (describing California's recent expansion of parole eligibility and concluding that such reform "accounts for cases where the cost is prohibitive and the risk is
infinitesimal").
92. Compassionate release includes medical parole and elderly parole. Klingele, Judicial Sentence Modification, supra note 8, at 492-93. The theory behind compassionate release is that those prisoners cost the state more in medical expenses assumed by the prison
and are simultaneously somehow less dangerous either because they have aged out of the
high recidivist age bracket or they are so seriously ill that they cannot pose a measurable
threat to public safety. See id.
93. See Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 8, at 428; Reitz, supra note 65, at 1103-04.
94. O'Hear, supra note 10, at 1275. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 1288.
95. Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 8, at 429.
96. Id. at 430.
97. Id.; see also S.B. 5891, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
98. Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 8, at 430.
99. Id. Prisoners sentenced after July 2010 are once again limited to reducing their
sentences by a third.
100. See H.B. 1020, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011); S.B. 5866, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2011).
101. Jordan Schrader, Early Release Plan Disappears,THE OLYMviAN (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://ww.theolympian.com/2011/04/29/1633598/early-release-plan-disappears.html.
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sion failed to become law. Conservative state representatives did not support the bipartisan reform; more surprisingly, liberal state representatives
overwhelmingly refused to support the proposal as well.102 There are two
interesting take-aways from Washington's struggle to manage its prison
population from initial incarceration to early release. First, early release
reforms were driven by a desire to realize more cost-savings in the criminal justice system. This illustrates the economic justification central to the
neorehabilitative model of reform. Second, support for the reform efforts
was grounded in heavy reliance upon evidence-based programming and
predictive tools.
Illinois provides an example of unsuccessful early release reform that
was not grounded within the framework of neorehabilitation. Illinois has
struggled very publicly to manage its prison population through back-end
sentencing reform. The state informally permitted a "meritorious good
time credit," or MGT-Push, program in which correctional officers could
use their discretion to grant lower level prisoners early release.103 Though
the state customarily permitted early release through meritorious good
time only to prisoners who served at least sixty days in prison, media
reports revealed that prisoners were "secret[ly]" being released after
serving only a few weeks of their sentences.104 In reality, the state expanded the MGT-Push program as a means to manage its overcrowded
prison population, and "[w]ithin several months' time, nine releasees had
been charged with new crimes, seventeen had been returned to prison on
allegations of new violent criminal activity, and thirty-one had been taken
into custody on allegations of nonviolent rule violations." 0 5 The public
outcry in response to this practice resulted in immediate suspension of
the program and new legislation restricting prison officials' ability to
award good time credit for early release from state prison.106 The discourse surrounding Illinois's push program did not center on neorehabilitation. As a result, the state lost several of the key tools used to
manage its state prison population and subsequently struggled to deal
with additional pressures from overcrowded prisons. 0 7 Recent legislation
102. See id. Only one democratic state senator supported Senate Bill 5891. Id. That bill
would have imposed the flat rate reductions in sentences for most offenders without reinvestment in evidence-based programming and risk assessment tools. Adam Kline, Early
Release with a Conscience, SENATE DEMOCRATS BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011), http://blog.senatedemocrats.wa.gov/kline/early-release-with-a-conscience/.
103. Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 8, at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. See Fan, supra note 8, at 626-27; Kingele, Early Demise, supranote 8, at 433-34. In
2009, the Associated Press reported that the MGT-Push program was a "secret program"
to release state prisoners early. See Klingele, Judicial Sentence Modification, supra note 8,
at 496.
105. Klingele, Judicial Sentence Modification, supra note 8, at 496.
106. Fan, supra note 8, at 627; Klingele, Early Demise, supra note 8, at 434; Klingele,
Judicial Sentence Modification, supra note 8, at 496.
107. Illinois legislators reintroduced legislation to expand the MPT-Push Program in
the face of economic pressures and over-incarceration. See Illinois Prison Overcrowding:
State Lawmaker Pushes for Early Release Program'sReturn, HuFF. PosT (Apr. 12, 2012),
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/12/illinois-prison-overcrowding-n1421007.html.
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proposed in Illinois to address overcrowded prisons, however, does fit
within the neorehabilitative framework. In 2012, new legislation passed
which reintroduces the MPT-Push Program with the assistance of risk assessment tools.108 In particular, it focuses on diverting low-level, nonviolent offenders through good time credits accumulated for early release. 109
Legislators emphasized efficacy in the criminal justice system and measurements of the likelihood of rehabilitation amongst certain offenders
when promoting the new bill. 110
B.

PAROLE REVOCATION REFORM

Texas and California provide good examples of parole revocation reforms aimed specifically at managing their exploding prison populations
by promoting rehabilitation. In 2006, when Texas faced the prospect of
building three new prisons to meet increased demand for prison beds,
then Texas Republican Representative Jerry Madden proposed investing
in cheaper alternatives that divert low-level offenders from incarceration,
such as rehabilitative programs."' This alternative approach also included assigning nonviolent offenders to mental health and drug treatment programs instead of prison, placing those serving less than two
years in short-term jails, and engaging in early intervention, such as helping low-income mothers.1 2 In its chosen reforms, Texas allocated a portion of the savings realized through these reforms for reinvestment into
the treatment programs generating the savings.11 3 Consequently, Texas
successfully averted spending an anticipated $2 billion to expand its
prison system, and, further, its prison population stabilized.11 4 In recent
years, however, these cost-saving initiatives have suffered from budget
cuts." 5 Additionally, the prison population has started to increase
108. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3 (2013) (requiring Director to consider risk assessment analyses among other factors when determining eligible inmates for the award of
sentence credits).
109. Id.
110. State Senator Kwame Raoul, chief sponsor of the bill, emphasized that the legislation "allows the Department of Corrections to take into account factors, such as past offenses and an assessment of the likelihood of successful rehabilitation, to make smart and
safe choices about the early release of inmates." Illinois Law Passed to Reduce Prison
Overcrowding, Improve Public Safety, AUSTIN TALKS, http://austintalks.org/2012/06/illinois-laws-passed-to-reduce-prison-overcrowding-improve-public-safety/. He also endorsed
a broader investment in using risk assessment tools to improve criminal justice policies and
use correctional resources more wisely. Id.
111. Texas projected an increase in prison bed use of 17,332 by 2012. TEX. LEGISLATIVE
BUDGET BD., ADULT AND JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS FISCAL

YEARS 2007-2012 10 (2007). The beds were estimated to cost the state $2 billion. Fan,
supra note 8, at 636. Madden proposed an investment package costing only $240 million.
Id.
112. Fan, supra note 8, at 636.
113. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 509.016 (West 2008); ACLU, supra note 5, at 20-21.
114. ACLU, supra note 5, at 17.
115. Brandi Grissom, Budget Cuts Would Undo Prison Re-Entry Reforms, THE TEXAS
TRIBUNE (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-dept-criminal-justice/texas-department-of-criminal-justice/budget-cuts-would-undo-prison-re-entry-reforms/.
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again.116
California's recent and drastic criminal justice reforms also demonstrate a shift towards neorehabilitation. California has notoriously struggled with its exploding prison population.11 7 In response to a federal
order to reduce its prison population by up to 46,000 prisoners, the state
implemented several sentencing reforms to divert offenders from state
prison.1 18 For example, California recently enacted medical parole for
prisoners so severely ill that they pose little threat to public safety.119
Most notably, however, California implemented the 2011 Realignment
Legislation addressing public safety.120 The state's new plan shifts the responsibility for nonserious, nonviolent, and nonsexual offenders from the
state to the counties.121 Though it remains to be seen whether this reform
will actually reduce the state's mass incarceration problems,122 the reform
contributed to California having the largest decline in the nation of state
116. Over the past ten years, the Texas prison population has generally increased. See
TEX. LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BD., CURRENT CORRECTIONAL POPULATION INDICATORS:
ADULT AND JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS MONTHLY REPORT 1 (2012) (referencing the Texas Department of Criminal Justice population graph for 2002 to present).
But see Mike Ward, Texas Prison Population Shrinks as Rehabilitation Programs Take
Root, STATESMAN (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.statesman.com/news/texas-politics/texasprison-population-shrinks-as-rehabilitation-programs-take-2434526.html.
117. See Klingele, Judicial Sentence Modification, supra note 8, at 484-85; see also
Michael Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration:Why is California Lagging Behind?, 28 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1275, 1298-99 (2012) (noting that "commentators have speculated that California's budget crisis would force the state to consider comprehensive sentencing reform"
since at least 2004).
118. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922-23 (2011). Though the Supreme Court affirmed the order in 2010, a three-judge panel ordered the reduction in 2009. See Coleman
v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 TBH, 2009 WL 2430820, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). Thus, California took preliminary steps to address the overcrowded prison population even as the order was pending review before the United States
Supreme Court. See Klingele, Judicial Sentence Modification, supra note 8, at 485 & n.85.
119. See S.B. 1399, 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (enacted) (allowing early release
for a prisoner "permanently medically incapacitated with a medical condition that renders
him or her permanently unable to perform activities of basic daily living, and results in the
prisoner requiring 24-hour care" if he or she does not "reasonably pose a threat to public
safety"); see also Vitiello, supra note 117, at 1300 & n.224 (collecting data to illustrate that
California's Parole Hearing Board is not using its newfound discretion in a way that
"open[s] the prison doors" through compassionate release programs).
120. A.B. 109, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (enacted).
121. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., 2011 PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FACT
SHEET 3 (2012) [hereinafter CDOC].
122. It remains to be seen whether this reform emphasizes rehabilitation through its
diversion of offenders. At the same time that the state approved A.B. 109, it also decreased
restrictions for counties to obtain funding for new jail sites. A.B. 111, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2011) (enacted). Thus, realignment could potentially shift state offenders from state
prisons to county jails without affecting the rate of incarceration in the state. This poses a
very serious problem because the ACLU continues to file suit against the county of Los
Angeles for persistent Eighth Amendment violations. See Rosas, et al. v. Baca et al., ACLU
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/rosas-et-al-v-baca-et-al (The ACLU of
Southern California filed a federal class action suit against Los Angeles County Sheriff on
January 18, 2012, alleging a longstanding and widespread pattern of violence by deputies
against county inmates.). Because the transition to counties will take a full two years to
achieve, the effectiveness of realignment in reducing incarceration in the state is not yet an
area ripe for detailed analysis. See CDOC, supra note 121 (stating that realignment will be

implemented by 2013). However, some scholars suggest that, at the very least, California
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prisoners in 2010.123 Much of the justification for California's Realignment Legislation centers on rehabilitation. 124 For example, the plan allocates power to counties to decide whether to incarcerate or
rehabilitate,125 and the plan encourages several rehabilitative-focused
programs as a means to manage the increase in offenders handled by
counties.126 Nevertheless, the statute maintains an explicit focus on cost
efficiency and public safety.127
C. DRUG COURTS
Drug courts are perhaps the most obvious examples of the neorehabilitative model in the context of sentencing policy reform. As diversionary programs, they divert drug offenders from the typical criminal
justice response to drug crimes-incarceration-and instead offer drug
treatment to qualifying, addicted offenders. Established by Miami courts
in 1989, drug courts have grown in popularity as recent events have required states to manage their prison populations.128 According to a 2008
survey conducted by the National Center for State Courts, the expansion
missed an opportunity to implement more comprehensive sentencing reforms when it enacted the Realignment Legislation. See Vitiello, supra note 117, at 1303.
123. GUERINO ET AL., supra note 37, at 14 app. Thl.1. California accounted for 71% of
the states' composite 4% decrease in parole revocations from 2000 to 2010, a direct result
of the realignment plan. Id. at 6.
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3450(b)(8) (West 2011) (expecting counties to use alternative
sanctions and county social services programs to manage parole violators); DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP:
CORRECTIONS 24 (2011) (explaining that realignment reflects the belief that counties can

do better at rehabilitating offenders than the state); Elliott Currie, "Realigning" Criminal
Justice in California:Real Reform, or Shifting the Deck Chairs?, DISSENT MAGAZINE (Oct.
31, 2011), http://dissentmagazine.orglonline.php?id=554 (noting that promoters of realignment claim the new approach to criminal justice will "devote considerably more resources
to the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners into the community").
125. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 124, at 26 (describing options available to counties).
126. As part of the Realignment Legislation, the state legislature envisioned a partnership between local public safety entities and the counties to provide and expand community-based punishment for offenders paroled from state prison. CAL. PENAL § 3450(b)(6).
"'Community-based punishment' means evidence-based correctional sanctions and programming," including intermediate sanctions to prevent offenders from returning to
prison. Id. § 3450(b)(8). The statute lists several alternatives to incarceration, including
intensive community supervision; home detention with electronic monitoring or GPS monitoring; mandatory community service; restorative justice programs; furlough programs;
work release programs; day reporting; mandatory residential or nonresidential substance
abuse treatment programs; mother-infant care programs; and community-based rehabilitative programs offering supervision, drug and alcohol treatment, literacy programming, employment counseling, psychological counseling, and mental health treatment. Id.
§ 3450(b)(8)(A)-(L).
127. CAL. PENAL § 3450(b)(7) (requiring correctional practice to fit into the "justice
reinvestment strategy"-"a data-driven approach to reduce corrections and related criminal justice spending"-as part of a larger movement towards "manag[ing] and allocat[ing]
criminal justice populations more cost effectively" while increasing public safety).
128. See Michael M. O'Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response
to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 463, 479 (2009) (explaining that since their
creation in Miami in 1989, drug courts have expanded and now exist in all fifty states);
Alex Kreit, The DecriminalizationOption: Should States ConsiderMoving from a Criminal
to a Civil Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 305 (noting that drug courts
have been a prevalent emphasis of recent state and federal sentencing reform).
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of drug courts is a primary reform effort employed by the states.129 Today, there are more than 2,500 drug courts in the United States,130 and
that number is likely to increase in light of the Obama administration's
pledge to grant more funds towards federal drug courts.131
The explicit goal of drug courts is to provide certain drug offenders
with treatment to cure their drug addictions in order to prevent future
recidivism induced by addiction.132 A traditionally nonadversarial model,
drug courts require the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge to agree
that diversion will promote public safety and rehabilitation.133 Drug
courts use evidence-based programming and risk assessment tools to determine which programs are most effective to treat addiction and which
offenders are most likely to rehabilitate.13 4 Typically, drug courts include
only individuals convicted of specific drug possession offenses and only
low-level, first-time offenders. 35
Drug courts are generally considered a successful alternative to incarceration. In a recent study, California concluded that investing in drug
courts has saved the state $11,000 per offender in recidivism reduction
129. Warren, supra note 20, at 277 (noting that a survey by the National Center for
State Courts reported that the expansion of drug courts was "among the leading current
sentencing reform efforts in the states").
130. There are currently 2,734 drug courts in the United States. Types of Drug Courts,
NAT'L Ass'N DRUG COURT PROF'LS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/
models (last visited May 27, 2013).
131. Kreit, supra note 128, at 305-06. Drug courts are slowly developing at the federal
level, See Mosi Secret, Outside Box, FederalJudges Offer Addicts a Free Path, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2013, at Al ("So far, federal judges have instituted programs in California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Virginia and Washington.").
In addition, there are several other specialized criminal courts developing around the
country in large numbers. McLeod, supra note 15, at 1606. These include "mental health
courts,

. .

. domestic violence courts,

. .

. veterans courts, sex offense courts, and reentry

courts." Id. These courts differ in the relative amount of rehabilitation they intend to offer,
but each was designed after the drug court model and thus falls within the broader paradigm of reducing incarceration through diversion and "problem-oriented" resolution of the
criminal offense. See id. at 1611. Although this Article does not detail the limitations of
alternative problem-oriented courts, the arguments launched in reference to drug courts
generally apply to those courts as well, given the similar underlying incentives. See Jessica
M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm (forthcoming 2014) (exploring the influence of specialized courts on broader sentencing reforms).
132. Drug courts were initially conceived as a means to manage the pressures of high
drug caseloads. Fan, supra note 8, at 640. However, their contemporary goal is to provide
an alternative to incarceration by focusing on addiction treatment as a means to reduce
recidivism. See Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REv. 783, 799
(2008) ("The supposed first-order drug-court aim [is] to stop the cycle of addiction and
incarceration among recidivist addicted drug users.").
133. Kreit, supra note 128, at 306-07.
134. Wolff, supra note 21, at 1412 ("Because [drug] courts focus on nontraditional
methods of rehabilitation, the evaluations that are done-especially those that measure
recidivism-have promoted the use of statistical analysis and, hence, the goals of evidencebased sentencing.").
135. Bowers, supra note 132, at 798-99; Kreit, supra note 128, at 308; O'Hear, supra
note 128, at 480; see also AVINASH SINGH BHATI ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY

CTR., To TREAT

OR NOT TO TREAT: EVIDENCE ON THE PROSPECTS OF EXPANDING TREATMENT To DRUG-INVOLVED OFFENDERS 7 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/

UploadedPDF/411645_treatment_offenders.pdf ("A survey of adult drug courts in 2005 ...
found that only 12% of drug courts accept clients with any prior violent convictions.").
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and victim costs. 13 6 Moreover, the public and policy makers are becoming
increasingly receptive to the concept of drug courts as an appropriate
means to manage low-level criminal offenders with drug addictions. 137
Thus, drug courts have emerged as an appealing judicial response to dissatisfaction with the incarceration-focused national drug policies.1 38
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF NEOREHABILITATION TO
DOWNSIZE STATE PRISON POPULATIONS
Neorehabilitation is an appealing theory of reform, particularly because many scholars and policy makers embrace the expanded use of evidence-based programs and actuarial tools to inform various criminal
justice policies. 13 9 If the United States faces an overincarceration problem today, then why not return to the guiding theory of reform that existed when the United States had a stable prison population? And if this
new rehabilitative model is proven by its measureable success, then
where is the harm in embracing this shift? This Part addresses these questions by setting forth three potential limitations in shifting to the neorehabilitative theory and its focus on evidence-based programming and
predictive tools.
It should be noted that this Article does not condemn the above-mentioned reform efforts in total. Indeed, it is unclear whether these reforms
are so detrimental that they do more harm than good, given the dire
straits of overincarcerated state prisons and strapped state budgets. However, this Article does assert that there is a high political cost in adopting
the neorehabilitative model to address the larger problem of overincarceration in the United States. If the emergency efforts discussed above
do transition from short-term reform to long-term policy-as the institutionalization of drug courts suggests they might-then the potential costs
to society should be as much a part of the conversation as the economic
136. See Kreit, supra note 128, at 309-10 (reporting that drug courts cost only $3,000
per offender, as opposed to $14,000 per incarcerated offender).
137. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH Assocs. INT'L FOR THE NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, THE NCSC SENTENCING ArrITUDEs SURVEY: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 2
(2006), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D ResearchlDocuments/NCSCSentencingSurvey-ReportFinal060720.pdf (finding "[h]igh levels of public support ... for alternatives to a prison sentence like probation, restitution, and mandatory participation in job
training, counseling or treatment programs, at least for non-violent offenders"); see also
PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN

100: BEHIND

BARS IN AMERICA

2008, at 3 (noting in

2008 that "policy makers are becoming increasingly aware of research-backed strategies for
community corrections .. . [including] more effective supervision and treatment programs"
that encourage policy makers to "diversify their states' array of criminal sanctions with
alternative options for low-risk offenders" in particular); Savage, supra note 3 (describing
policy makers' "broad rethinking of alternatives to incarceration," including increased diversion into drug treatment programs).
138. Miller, supra note 24, at 420-24.
139. Fan, supra note 8, at 639-40 (noting its appeal to conservatives and liberals, as well
as the general public); see, e.g., Oleson, supra note 21, at 1394 (endorsing sentencing reform from a scholarly perspective); Warren, supra note 20, at 277 (describing judges' endorsement of the expansion of actuarial tools in sentencing reform from a practical
perspective).
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savings that states hope to achieve through these reforms. This Article,
and in particular this Part, is a step towards opening this dialogue. Thus, it
demonstrates that while neorehabilitation may offer a short-term solution
to mass incarceration, it will institutionalize three key perversions into
the criminal justice system. These perversions, in turn, may prevent the
long-term shift away from overreliance on incarceration in our criminal
justice system.
A.

Low-HANGING FRUITS: REHABILITATING THE
WRONG OFFENDERS

Neorehabilitation focuses on identifying the least risky offenders to divert from prison, either through early release or rehabilitative treatment.

Evidence-based practices are "policies, procedures, programs, and practices" that help reduce the risk of recidivism, as demonstrated by scientific research.140 Actuarial tools help correctional officers and lawmakers
identify which offenders are best suited for the programs because their
characteristics suggest that they are less likely to recidivate in the first
place.141 The ultimate goal of such rehabilitative efforts, then, is to identify the low-hanging fruits in prison and apply rehabilitative programming
to these individuals, thus leaving the more risky offenders to languish in
prison for longer periods of time.
This goal is flawed because it focuses on the wrong offenders. Empirical studies indicate that the most risky offenders benefit most from rehabilitative treatment. 142 For example, a 2000 study found that there were
larger treatment effects for higher risk cases of violent offenders.143 Several additional studies have found similar results concerning treatment
for sex offenders and drug offenders. 144 A particularly revealing 2006
study found "larger effects for treatment groups with greater overall proportions of high-risk participants."1 4 5 These results are unsurprising, con140. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3450(b)(9) (West 2011) (defining evidence-based
practiccs).
141. See Wolff, supra note 21, at 1405 ("Risk-assessment factors are designed to 'predict[ ] who will or will not behave criminally in the future.' ") (citation omitted).
142. This subsection uses empirical studies to contradict the publicly perceived and generally accepted findings of evidence-based programming, specifically that low-risk and
nonviolent offenders are most capable of rehabilitation. It may seem odd to rely upon
evidence-based studies to support the finding that evidence-based studies are focusing on
the wrong offenders. However, the underlying point in using such information is to suggest
that policy makers are choosing to use evidence-based programming in a particular way
that advances neorehabilitation. Underlying the evidence of efficacy is a judgment about
which offenders deserve to be rehabilitated and which offenders should not be released or
rehabilitated.
143. Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews, Effective Correctional Treatment and Violent Reoffending: A Meta-Analysis, 42 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 460 (2000); Lipsey & Cul-

len, supra note 35, at 312 (summarizing the study and others asserting similar results); see
D.A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369, 377, 384 (1990).
144. Lipsey & Cullen, supra note 35, at 312 (collecting studies).
145. Id. (summarizing study); Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Risk Principle in
Action: What Have We Learned from 13,676 Offenders and 97 CorrectionalPrograms?,51
CRIME & DELINo. 1, 12 (2006).
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sidering that "higher-risk offenders have a greater need for treatment
[than others] and [therefore] also have more room for improvement."1 46
Despite this reality, neorehabilitation stands to institutionalize the misguided focus on diverting only low-level, low-risk offenders into rehabilitation programs. Frequently, proponents of these programs justify the
narrow focus because of its financial viability in this economic environment.147 Bipartisan calls for reform in particular emphasize evidence that
rehabilitation is cheaper than incarceration.14 8 Where the funding for
programs depends on proven success, there is less room for additional
expenses. And yet the most effective rehabilitation programs are those
that admit participants for longer periods of time and provide more
services. 149
Drug courts provide an excellent example of institutionalizing the rehabilitation of the wrong offenders. Drug courts have been highly criticized
since their creation, and two main criticisms are relevant to the critique of
neorehabilitation.o5 0 First, drug courts are typically over-inclusive. They
frequently admit offenders who are not actually serious drug addicts in
need of rehabilitative intervention. 151 One study indicates that "55 percent of [all offenders] .

.

. referred to treatment by a court program had

used their primary drug of abuse less than three times in the month
before they entered into treatment."1 52 Second, drug courts are typically
under-inclusive because those individuals most in need of the drug treatment programs are not being diverted to drug courts. 153 They may be
excluded formally as a result of a prior conviction,154 informally because
a prosecutor in his or her discretion refuses to recommend diversion, 5 5
or purposefully by their defense attorneys who advise against the offenders' entrance into the program for fear that they will fail and subse-

146. Lipsey & Cullen, supra note 35, at 312.
147. See, e.g., RIGHT ON CRIME, supra note 5; AUSTIN TALKS, supra note 110 ("We
need to begin to use risk assessment tools and well-calculated criminal justice policy to
make certain we utilize our corrections resources wisely.").
148. RIGHT ON CRIME, supra note 5; see, e.g., Fan, supra note 8, at 636 (discussing the
economic motivations that led to Texas's emergency sentencing reform efforts).
149. Lowenkamp et al., supra note 145, at 9-10.
150. Bowers, supra note 132; Kreit, supra note 128, at 305-24; Eric J. Miller, Embracing
Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
1479 (2004); O'Hear, supra note 128, at 465-66. This Article does not attempt to launch an
in-depth attack on drug courts. Numerous other scholars have surveyed that issue. See, e.g.,
JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT
13-14 (2001).
151. Bowers, supra note 132, at 797-98.
152. Kreit, supra note 128, at 316.
153. BHATI ET AL., supra note 135, at 7 ("Despite the pervasiveness of the drug treatment court model, drug courts routinely exclude most of the eligible population.").
154. O'Hear, supra note 128, at 478 ("[Drug courts] typically have eligibility requirements that exclude defendants who face ancillary nondrug charges or who have prior convictions for violent felonies.").

155. Bowers, supra note 132, at 798.
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quently receive harsher punishment.1 56 Consequently, drug courts
frequently fail to address the offender populations most in need of
treatment.
The underlying forces that drive the over- and under-inclusiveness of
drug courts are not coincidental; rather, they are the result of reforms
guided by neorehabilitation's theoretical framework. Drug courts have a
strong interest in accepting large numbers of nonaddicted clients because
"drug courts rely on funding that is contingent, implicitly or explicitly,
upon demonstrating results and treating a sufficient number of defendants." 5 7 Evidence indicates that drug courts "cherry pick" low-risk offenders and "skim" high-risk clients to boost their success rates. 5 8
Additionally, low-risk offenders cost less to treat than truly addicted offenders.' 5 9 Thus, where programs are designed with a focus on cost-effectiveness and evidence-based results-as they would be if states adopted
neorehabilitation as the guiding theory of reform-these inefficiencies
are likely to be institutionalized and expanded.
Similar issues of rehabilitating the wrong offenders are evident in recent efforts to expand early release programs. Studies demonstrate that
"lifers" have lower rates of recidivism among prisoners,160 yet they are
not even considered among those eligible for reconsideration under even
the most expansive of proposed early release plans. In fact, government
officials are going out of their way to ensure that "lifers" are off the table
for any type of prison term reduction. For example, in 2005, a loophole
was discovered that would have permitted early release for nearly 120
North Carolina state prisoners sentenced to life: if they gained sufficient
good-time credit, these "lifers" needed to serve only half their sentence.' 6 ' When this fact came to the public's attention, the legislature,
156. See id. at 792-94 ("[S]tudies found that the sentences for failing participants in
New York City drug courts were typically two-to-five times longer than the sentences for
conventionally adjudicated defendants"); Kreit, supra note 128, at 323.
157. Kreit, supra note 128, at 314.
158. Bowers, supra note 132, at 800 & nn.69-72 (anecdotal evidence); O'Hear, supra
note 128, 479-80 (reasoning).
159. See Kreit, supra note 128, at 320; see also, e.g., KRISTIN WHITE ET AL., IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH & EVALUATION, CULTURALLY COMPETENT
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROJECT: ANNUAL REPORT, at i (2009), availableat http://
iconsortium.subst-abuse.uiowa.edu/downloads/IDPH/Culturally%2OCompetent%20Sub-

stance%20Abuse%20Treatment%20Project%20Evaluation%20Report%20FY09.pdf.
160. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole
Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 27, 28 (2010) ("Lifers" have lower rates
of recidivism on release because of "the duration of their imprisonment, the maturity they
are likely to gain in prison, and their age upon reentry into the community."); see also
MARC MAUER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJEcT, THE MEANING OF "LIFE": LONG
PRISON SENTENCES IN CoNTEXT 23-24 (2004); Dolovich, supra note 53, at 112.
161. See State v. Bowden, 668 S.E.2d 107, 109 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (reciting that N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-2 (1974) defined "life imprisonment" as an eighty-year sentence);
Dolovich, supra note 53, at 113-14. In 1981, the North Carolina legislature passed a law
permitting up to a 50% reduction in sentences for good behavior, which, in 1983, was
applied retroactively to prisoners sentenced before 1981. Dolovich, supra note 53, at 113.
Though the legislature redefined "life imprisonment" as life without parole in 1978, this
small "loophole" allowed prisoners sentenced between 1974 and 1978 to obtain release
with sufficient good-time credits after forty years of imprisonment. Id. at 113-14.
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Governor Perdue, and a victims rights' association advocated ardently
against their release. 162 Although Bobby Bowden, the habeas petitioner
whose case brought this loophole to light, managed to obtain his freedom, 16 3 the state prevailed in a subsequent suit alleging the same loophole, which ultimately produced a state supreme court opinion that
prevented any future claims.'1 Meanwhile, offenders sentenced to life
without parole (LWOP) are one of the largest growing incarcerated populations in the country.165 Moreover, these long-term, high-risk offenders
face the possibility of losing funding for rehabilitation programs as the
funding is shifted towards those offenders most likely to be released.166
This funding shift may create a division within the prisoners' rights dialogue,167 but it also reflects the "cherry-picking" mentality evident in the
context of drug courts. Thus, neorehabilitation guides states to address
the "low-hanging fruits" of criminal offenders, but as with drug courts,
many of the reforms envisioned by such programs fail to address the class
of prisoners at the root of the mass incarceration problem.

B.

EXACERBATING RACIAL DISPARITIES

Neorehabilitation will potentially exacerbate racial disparities that already exist in state prison populations. These disparities are stark and
growing. For example, while Blacks make up twelve percent of the general population, they constitute more than forty percent of all state prison
populations.168 This racial disparity has grown over the past forty years as
the rate of incarceration has also increased.169 Large disparities in rates of

incarceration also exist between other racial and ethnic groups, including
Hispanics and Native Americans, but none are as glaring as the disparate
rates of incarceration between Blacks and Whites. 170
162. Dolovich, supra note 53, at 114.
163. Bowden, 668 S.E.2d at 110.
164. Jones v. Keller, 698 S.E.2d 49, 57 (N.C. 2010).
165. LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 41, at 2-3 & figs.I.1 & 1.2 ("Between 1992 and
2008, the LWOP population in the United States increased 230%, so that today more prisoners are serving life terms than ever before."); MAUER ET AL., supra note 160, at 3; Nellis,
supra note 160, at 27 (reporting that in 1992, 12,453 individuals were serving LWOP
sentences and that number has subsequently tripled).
166. See Barkow, supra note 67, at 209-10. Note that the term "lifers" does not necessarily connote murderers and violent offenders. Id. A widening range of offenders receives
life sentences as a result of habitual offender laws and increasingly punitive sentence
ranges. See Nellis, supra note 160, at 27 ("In at least 37 states, LWOP is available for
nonhomicide convictions, including convictions for kidnapping, burglary, robbery, carjacking, and battery."). Additionally, several states, including Florida, require LWOP for conviction under serious habitual offender laws. Id. at 27-28.
167. See Michael Velardo, Prison Programsthat Help Inmates Being Cut by States, ExAMINER.COM (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/article/prison-programs-that-helpinmates-being-cut-by-states.
168. See GUERINO ET AL., supra note 37, at 28 tbl.16B; O'Hear, supra note 128, at

466-67.
169. See O'Hear,supra note 128, at 466.
170. See GUERINO ET AL., supra note 37, at 27 tbl.15 (the black rate of incarceration
was more than twice the Hispanic rate of incarceration in 2010); MARC MAUER & RYAN S.
KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY
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Actuarial tools potentially exacerbate racial disparities because the
typical risk factors used to screen offenders for rehabilitative programming are often proxies for structural inequities disproportionately plaguing historically disadvantaged populations. Actuarial tools as a predictor
of recidivism have existed since 1928, when Ernest Burgess developed a
parole prediction instrument in Illinois based on "twenty-two different
variables, ranging from father's nationality to psychiatric prognosis."17 1
Different models of prediction emerged in the following forty years, and
by the time rehabilitation declined in the 1970s, there were four different
models in use, all of which depended on several of the same factors. 172
While predictive tools explicitly used race as a risk factor as late as
1979,173 this factor disappeared due to constitutional infirmity.1 74 Today,
the use of actuarial tools has expanded to various areas of criminal justice
reform, including sentencing,1 7 5 prison placement,17 6 parole release,' 77
and now diversionary programs as well.178 The factors typically include a
range of six different characteristics about the offender: criminal history,
drug and alcohol use, employment history and education, connection to
others with criminal histories, mental health, and financial situation. 179
The most consistent factor among the predictive tools-and frequently
the most heavily weighted factor-is criminal history. 180 This factor operRACE AND ETHNICITY

1-2 (2007) (recognizing the increasing rate of incarceration among

Hispanics since 1990).
171. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 56-59; Oleson, supra note 21, at 1348.

172. Notable models include the Burgess model (1928), which depended on twenty-two
variables, including race; the Glueck model (1950), which depended on seven factors with a
heavy emphasis on criminal history; the Federal Salient Score (1974), which used nine factors; and the Greenwood scale (1982), which was designed specifically to facilitate selective
incapacitation and used seven factors. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 73-75 (tbl.2.3); see
also Oleson, supra note 21, at 1348 & n.117.
173. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race 5 & App'x (Law Sch., Univ. of Chi.,
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 535 (2d series)), available at http://
www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/535-323-bh-race.pdf (stating that "[tihe table reveals a continued use of race until at least the late 1960s" and that California's model, developed in
the 1970s. relied on race as one of only four factors to predict recidivism); see JONATHAN
SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS,

1890-1990 172-75 (1993) (showing that California's predictive tool used race until 1979).
174. See Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1127,
1158 (2011) ("Under American constitutional law, demographic traits other than race can
probably be predicates for prediction."). But see Oleson, supra note 21, at 1380-88 (arguing that considering race as a predictive factor of recidivism should be constitutional given
the Grutter exception to strict scrutiny).
175. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 4, at 23; Wolff, supra note 21, at 1406-08.

176. Petersilia, supra note 20, at 219-20 (describing California's risk assessment process
to determine prison classification, then comparing classification levels with other large
states that compute similar assessments).
177. See id. at 254.
178. See supra Part III.A.
179. See Oleson, supra note 21, at 1367.
180. Harcourt, supra note 173, at 7 ("Practically all of the prediction studies converged
on prior correctional contacts (arrests, convictions, and incarcerations) as one of the
stronger predictors of recidivism. What developed, as a result, were more simplistic but
easier to administer sentencing schemes that relied predominately on prior criminal history
. . ) .
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ates to disproportionately exclude the minority populations most overrepresented in the prison population today, in particular poor black
men. 18 1 As Harcourt explains, "the continuously increasing racial disproportionality in the prison population necessarily entails that the narrower
prediction instruments, focused as they are on prior criminality, are going
to hit hardest the African-American communities" already persistently
overrepresented in the prison population.18 2 For this reason, criminal history disparities cannot be "regarded as an entirely trustworthy indicator
of relative recidivism risk." 8 3
Neorehabilitation potentially exacerbates racial disparities because of
the overreliance on predictive tools. Though race is no longer an explicit
factor considered in prediction tools, other factors, particularly criminal
history, are likely to create a prison population composed of the historically disadvantaged populations already overrepresented in state prison
populations. 184 Where the barriers to entry into rehabilitative programming are based on factors dependent on structural inequities that already
exist in society-such as education, employment, and socioeconomic status' 8 5 -the use of these tools will only have a surface effect on the population most in need of diversion. Although use of race as an explicit factor
to predict recidivism is likely troubling to many, 186 depending on these
other factors may not offend anyone. Professor Bernard Harcourt explains that predictive factors tend to fall along a spectrum from those
loosely related to the offender's character to those narrowly tailored to
the actual criminal activity. 8 7 For example, an offender's criminal activity
is a factor that no one would object to using to determine risk of recidivism, but at the other end of the spectrum, those broader factors like
race, ethnicity, or gender may leave people feeling uncomfortable and
may even be found unconstitutional.1 88 Depending on employment, education, and other similar factors falls somewhere in the middle of this
181. Id. at 8.
182. Id.
183. See O'Hear, supra note 128, at 471 ("The more serious criminal records of black
drug defendants are at least in part a byproduct of law enforcement policies and practices
that systematically result in higher arrest risks for black drug offenders than white, for
instance, the tendency to focus on open-air drug markets and crack."); see also HARCOURT,
supra note 1, at 126-32 (on elasticities).
184. Harcourt, supra note 173, at 6-8.
185. See HUMAN RIGH-s WATCH, TARGETING BLACKS: DRUG LAw ENFORCEMENT
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 48 n.88 (2008) (noting that the black poverty rate is
25.6%, while the white poverty rate is 10.4%); Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence, and Social Control: The Paradoxof Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 188 (2008) (stating that "[t]he overwhelmingly poor
communities in which many poor African Americans live are marked by unemployment,
family disruption, and residential instability" and that such conditions of concentrated poverty and unemployment "predict the breakdown of community social processes, which in
turn produce[s] crime").
186. But see Oleson, supra note 21, at 1380-82 (arguing that race is one of the
predictors of recidivism in the United States and thus should be used in sentencing
determinations).

187. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 220-21.

188. Id.
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spectrum.' 8 9 As a result, they are unlikely to be excluded from predictive
tools.190
Some scholars may argue for the adoption of culturally sensitive predictive tools and evidence-based programming,' 9 ' but these suggestions
are unlikely to avoid the inherent potential for racially disparate results in
diversionary programs for two reasons. First, as explained above, the factors leading to disparate results are race neutral. Second, and more important to the critique of neorehabilitation, predictive tools and evidencebased programming are used to achieve cost-effective-i.e., cheaper-results. Evidence shows that rehabilitating racially neutral, socially underprivileged populations takes more time and more money. For example,
Iowa adopted a culturally competent rehabilitation program in two jurisdictions in 2010.192 These programs have experienced results similar to
traditional rehabilitation programs, but they stand to cost the state significantly more per offender because the offenders often stay in the programs much longer to reach the same results. 19 3
In the context of drug courts, the use of predictive tools to select and
divert those who are least violent and least likely to recidivate will in turn
create a prison population that does not reflect the general criminal offending population. If poor black men and middle class white men are
equally likely to be addicted to drugs, but the criminal justice system diverts middle class white males at a higher rate than poor black males, the
prison population will eventually become more black and more poor.
Professor Harcourt describes this as the "ratchet effect."1 94 Again, because minorities (particularly African Americans) disproportionately suffer from the high-risk factors on which most predictive tools are based,
they are most likely to either fail the rehabilitative programs or not be
diverted into the programs in the first place.195
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Fan, supra note 8, at 640-45.
192.

See Culturally Competent Substance Abuse Treatment, IOWA DEP'T PUB. HEALTH,

http://www.idph.state.ia.us/bh/culturally-competent.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (noting
that treatment providers were awarded a grant to provide services through June 30, 2012);
WHITE ET AL., supra note 159, at i.

193. The culturally competent pilot programs in 2009 successfully discharged 39.8% of
their participants, as compared to the 46.0% successful discharge rate in the traditional
program. WHITE ET AL., supra note 159, at ii. However, "[t]he median length of stay for

clients in the Cultural Competency group was one-hundred twelve days while the median
length of stay for clients in the Comparison group was sixty-four." Id. This evidence makes
clear that it is "cheaper" to rehabilitate the traditional [white] offenders admitted into the
statewide comparison group.
194. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 147 (defining the ratchet effect as a disproportionality
between the composition of the offending population and the carceral population that
grows over time).
195. See Bowers, supra note 132, at 807 ("Because drug courts are embedded within a
society where inequalities exist and onto a justice system that traditionally arrests and punishes minorities and the poor more frequently and harshly than others, coerced treatment
that uses conventional justice as a backstop leads to ultimate sentences that are informed
by the same social, economic, and institutional pressure points that historically have led to
disparate punishment under the conventional (incarceration-focused) war on drugs. Conse-
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But the use of predictive tools to downsize the prison population
through neorehabilitation suffers from an even greater threat than simply
exacerbating the racial disparities in the prison population: It stands to
further reinforce the perverse connection between blackness and criminality, 196 while under the perceived "rational" justification of science.
Turning again to drug courts as an example, if these courts treat and rehabilitate white middle-class men while diverting poor black men as unworthy or incapable of rehabilitation, race will conflate with the many highrisk characteristics that connote dangerousness and criminality. Further,
engaging this argument in the context of drug courts shows the particular
weakness of a "culturally sensitive" proscription to potential racial disparity problems. Some may perceive the fact that racial minorities are not
qualifying for rehabilitative diversionary programs or are unsuccessfully
failing out of such programs as a result of racially insensitive programming,197 but to many it may suggest that racial minorities are more dangerous, less willing or deserving of being rehabilitated, and ultimately
intertwined with the criminal justice system.198 Recent incidents in the
public media suggest that the perceived link between race and crime in
America is only deepening.19 9 The likelihood that voters will be willing to
fund dual programs to rehabilitate minority offenders during economically troubled times is low, given that it is contrary to the basic premise of
neorehabilitation and the message that such results could spawn.
C.

DISTORTION OF JUSTICE

Applying neorehabilitation as a framework to guide state sentencing
reforms will distort the perception of justice in the criminal justice system
in two ways. First, this framework not only potentially increases punishment for those offenders viewed as undeserving of rehabilitation because
they are not low-level offenders; it also stands to increase punishment for
quently, addicts, minorities, and the underprivileged are terminated more frequently from
drug courts, even perhaps in circumstances where they are doing just as well (or as badly)
as their white and affluent counterparts."); O'Hear, supra note 128, at 477 ("[E]vidence
now suggests that white drug offenders are more likely to benefit from this 'pathway out'
than black drug offenders. This means that [drug courts] are apt to exacerbate, not ameliorate, overall racial disparities.").
196. See ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 192-95 (describing the stigma of conflating
racial identity and crime); KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME 14 (2d ed.
2009) (describing the conflation of the black man with crime as the "criminal Blackman").
197. See Fan, supra note 8, at 642.
198. See, e.g., Oleson, supra note 21, at 1356-59.
199. In 2012, seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin was shot and killed in a gated community in Sanford, Florida. The assailant, George Zimmerman, called 911 to report that Martin-a tall, black male-looked "real suspicious" in the neighborhood before pursuing
Martin and ultimately shooting the boy to death. The tragedy has subsequently opened a
litany of dialogues surrounding race, guns, and the regulation of space in both the media
and legal scholarship. See Charles M. Blow, The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at A21(L) ("This case has reignited a furor about vigilante justice,
racial-profiling and equitable treatment under the law, and it has stirred the pot of racial
strife."). The tragedy undeniably raises questions of the implicit connection between blackness and criminality when considering what made Martin look "real suspicious."
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those offenders perceived as less deserving because they failed to rehabilitate themselves during their "second chance" opportunities from the
courts. In the context of drug courts, ample evidence demonstrates that
criminal offenders who have participated in drug courts and failed, for
whatever reason, receive much harsher punishments. 200 For example, two
studies in New York City found that the sentences for failing participants
in the city's drug courts were typically two to five times longer than the
sentences for conventionally adjudicated defendants. 201
Although drug courts provide the most salient example of this limitation, the prevalence and expansion of life without parole (LWOP)
sentences also demonstrate the way that neorehabilitation, emphasizing
merit and efficiency, may distort our perception of justice into one that is
decidedly more punitive. For example, in Graham v. Florida,the Florida
judge who sentenced Terrance Jamar Graham to life without parole only
did so after the sixteen-year-old boy had received a diversionary sentence. 202 Graham and an accomplice were previously arrested in 2003 after attempting to rob a restaurant owner. 203 Graham was charged as an
adult and ultimately pleaded guilty to armed burglary with assault and
attempted armed robbery. 204 He faced up to life in prison without parole,
but the trial judge accepted a plea agreement and withheld adjudication
of guilt on both charges, instead sentencing him to one year at a pre-trial
juvenile detention facility and, thereafter, to three years of probation. 205
Within six months of his release, Graham again attempted robbery and
found himself before a different judge for a probation revocation hearing. 20 6 This time, the judge showed no mercy and sentenced Graham to
the maximum statutory sentence for his offenses: life without parole. 207
During the colloquy with Graham, the judge made several statements to
illustrate that this sentence was harsh in response to Graham's inability to
capitalize on his second chance. 208 Indeed, the average prison sentence
for both adults and juveniles in Florida for armed burglary is under nine
200. Bowers, supra note 132, at 792-93 & n.33 (anecdotal evidence); Kreit, supra note
128, at 314-20 (statistical evidence); O'Hear, supra note 128, at 480-81 (reasoning).
201. Bowers, supra note 132, at 792-94.
202. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018-20 (2010).
203. Id. at 2018.
204. Id.
205. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 087412), 2009 WL 2159655, at *13-14.
206. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018-19.
207. Id. at 2020 (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003)).
208. For example, the judge said,
I don't understand why you would be given such a great opportunity to do
something with your life and why you would throw it away. The only thing
that I can rationalize is that you decided that this is how you were going to
lead your life and that there is nothing that we can do for you... . [W]e can't
help you any further.. . . I don't see where I can do anything to help you any
further. You've evidently decided this is the direction you're going to take in
life, and it's unfortunate that you made that choice.
Id.
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years. 209 The punishment Graham received after failing his rehabilitative
opportunity was harsher than his likely punishment had he not been diverted in the first place. And while the Supreme Court intervened to create a categorical ban on sentences of life without parole for juvenile
offenders in nonhomicide cases, 210 the facts of this case continue to illustrate the danger of neorehabilitation. That is, justice ultimately becomes
tied to an offender's ability to rehabilitate, and the inability to do so may
result in harsher sentences for the same criminal offense.
Additionally, as early-release legislation is being passed by state legislatures, it frequently is accompanied by measures increasing punishments
for other, more serious offenders. For example, South Carolina recently
passed legislation eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for simple
drug possession, 211 expanding parole eligibility for offenders convicted of
several felonies, 212 and enacting early release plans for nonviolent offenders after two years of imprisonment. 213 At the same time, the state added
twenty-four new crimes to the list of violent crimes, 214 and it enacted a
new "Two Strikes/Three Strikes" law, subjecting more offenses to LWOP
sentences in the state. 215 These reforms will likely have the long-term effect of negating the release of several groups of low-level offenders by
increasing the number of offenders serving LWOP sentences and reducing the number of persons who qualify for "nonviolent" crimes. 216
Reforms that appear to focus on rehabilitation while ratcheting up punitive sentences for many offenders are not coincidental. As one survey
indicates, seventy-two percent of the public believed that "keeping those
convicted of violent crimes in prison [for] longer is 'very' important,"
even as sixty-one percent of the public simultaneously called for expanding treatment programs for nonviolent offenders. 217 Justice, then,
becomes rehabilitation for few and greater punishment for most. This is
consistent with neorehabilitation's origin within the new penology. Populist punitiveness intensifies under this new framework because the managerial language used by the penal community lacks resonance in the
public and political discourse on crime. 218 Thus, the populist punitive209. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 205, at *57.
210. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
211. Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act, 2010 S.C. Acts 2004.
212. Id. at 1976 (including voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, carjacking, burglary in
the second degree, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery).
213. Id. at 2018 (allowing inmates who have been incarcerated for a minimum of two
years to be released to reentry supervision 180 days early).
214. Id. at 1984.
215. Id.
216. In February 2011, the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board found that
the law had thus far reduced the prison population by 600 people, even though the provisions had not been put into effect at that point. ACLU, supra note 5, at 39. Still, the longterm increase in prison sentence length for those offenders now disqualified from parole
eligibility and subject to habitual offender enhancements will not likely be seen for several
years, as was the case with the implementation of California's three-strikes law in the
1990s.
217. Warren, supra note 20, at 281 tbl.1.
218. See Simon, supra note 38, at 455.
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ness-rooted in normative judgments about aberrational evil and the
zero-tolerance sanctions for the criminal offender "other"-at times exists in tension with the new language of management and moderation. 219
The result, demonstrated by the expansion of punitive punishment for the
most "evil" and undeserving offenders, is the sometimes incoherent policy practice of implementing rehabilitative-focused punishment for some
but more punitive policies for most.2 2 0
In addition, neorehabilitation potentially distorts our perception of
criminal justice by valuing a goal that can conflict with the criminal justice
system. The neorehabilitative model values cost-efficiency, proven results, and "sure bet" investments to reduce the number of persons incarcerated. The criminal justice system, on the other hand, has only one goal:
to reduce crime. 22 1 Neorehabilitation does not necessarily reach that
same goal because incapacitating those who cannot be rehabilitated
cheaply does not necessarily reduce the incidence of crime. 222 Professor
Bernard Harcourt has demonstrated through mathematical analysis that
the use of predictive tools to focus criminal justice reforms does not reduce the commission of crime under rational actor theory. 223 The efficiencies purportedly achieved by policing and punishing through
predictive models incorrectly focus on identifying offenders rather than
on costs or effects to society as a whole. 2 2 4 For example, the use of predictive tools to punish recidivists longer, by both giving longer sentences and
denying parole release, adds more deterrent effects to particular offenders: recidivists. 225 Presuming that recidivists respond to deterrence similarly to non-recidivist citizens, at some point the focus on the identified
subgroup will be sufficient to discourage even the recidivist from reoffending. 226 However, the use of predictive tools does not take into account the comparative elasticity of different offending groups and cannot
be curtailed once the likelihood of offending is reduced. 227 Thus one subpopulation receives more punitive resources at the expense of the
219. Id.
220. Simon predicted that "when the public learns that a new penology-minded bureaucracy often moderates its punitive mandates, the response is generally one of falling back
on punitiveness." Id. The wrinkle with neorehabilitation, versus simply the new penology,
is that this distinction is being drawn along lines of merit and not the total sum of criminal
offenders. Hyper-punitiveness is appropriate for some, but for all. Low-level drug offenders find themselves falling on the sympathetic side of deservedness in a way that was
unimaginable twenty years ago. Compare Miller, supra note 24, at 421 (describing how the
"severity revolution" in penal policy originated by targeting drug dealers and drug users),
with, e.g., Editorial,Unjust Mandatory Minimums, N.Y. TIMES, at A22 (Feb. 19,2013) (criticizing excessive punishment of low-level drug offenders). The movement of this line appears to come from a normative shift in societal perceptions of evil in society.
221. Oleson, supra note 21, at 1332.
222. See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 129-32 (illustrating the inefficiency of maximizing
hit rates in police enforcement rather than focusing on reducing crime generally).
223. Id. at 142.
224. See id. at 139, 141.
225. See id. at 141-42.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 143.
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broader public, whose relative capacity for crime may increase unchecked. 228 What this means, for purposes of this argument, is that statistical tools focus on the wrong information as they endeavor to create
efficiencies. Rather than commission of crimes in society, the tools focus
on the likely commission of crimes by a subpopulation. 229 Though this
may reduce crime to a point, overreliance on this method paradoxically
creates the perversion of actually increasing overall crime.2 30 Thus, institutionalizing dependence upon predictive tools to improve sentencing
policies may unintentionally change the very purpose of punishment and
criminal justice by valuing efficiency over reducing crime.
V. NEOREHABILITATION AND TOTAL INCAPACITATION:
TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN
The limitations of the neorehabilitative model are inherent because this
particular form of rehabilitation, over-emphasizing evidence-based programming and predictive tools, has its origin in the same theory that created total incapacitation. Both neorehabilitation and total incapacitation
desire the same result: to identify and exclude the criminal. 231 This desire,
present since the decline of the old rehabilitative idea in the 1970s, requires mass incarceration to keep offenders out of society. Thus, scholars
recognize that the end of mass incarceration is intricately intertwined
with the theory of rehabilitation. 232 But this Article demonstrates that the
return to rehabilitation, alone, does not necessarily signify an end to the
overreliance on incarceration in the United States. Unless the return to
rehabilitation embraces inclusion-as opposed to exclusion of the offender-neorehabilitation will be nothing more than a rhetorical shift in
sentencing policies. In fact, as evidenced by some of the limitations discussed above, neorehabilitation potentially becomes a wolf in sheep's
clothing-more dangerous because it is cloaked in compassionate rhetoric that is more appealing to the public.
Neorehabilitation and total incapacitation build on efforts to identify
the criminal that were first expressed through selective incapacitation
theory. 233 The old rehabilitative model declined in the 1970s as policy
makers and the public lost faith in the ability for offenders to be success228. See id. at 145-56.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 143 (model demonstrating the increase in overall crime over time with the
use of parole prediction).
231. Neorehabilitation identifies the offender through prediction and enables elongated
exclusion of those offenders not identified as capable of rehabilitation. Total incapacitation
identifies all criminal offenders and excludes them all through incarceration.
232. See Barkow, supra note 67, at 198 (finding that the fate of life without parole, and
the abolition of this sentence, "is tied to views on rehabilitation"); Simon, supra note 41, at
292 ("Until the end of the 20th century, incapacitation mainly functioned as the dark and
presumptively minor side of the dominant rehabilitative penology (in the sense that most
prisoners were presumed capable of rehabilitation).").
233. See Note, Selective Incapitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictionsof Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512 (1982).
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fully rehabilitated. Selective incapacitation emerged in its wake during
the 1980s to 90s.234 This theory sought to predict which offenders were
capable of rehabilitation. 235 The belief was that if policy makers could
somehow distinguish between high-rate offenders and low-rate offenders-and incapacitate high-rate offenders earlier in their careers and for
longer periods of time-then street crime would decline. 2 36 In 1982, the
RAND Corporation launched its Habitual Offender Project in California,
which focused on identifying career criminals for harsher punishment
once convicted. 237 As states began reforming their sentencing policies,
they incorporated predictive factors, which punished repeat offenders
more heavily. The federal sentencing system, for example, specifically acknowledged that the criminal history categories, designed to increase
punishment based on prior convictions, were an attempt to identify the
most dangerous offenders and provide them with greater punishment, a
result of the desire to incapacitate them longer. 238
Total incapacitation and neorehabilitation derive from selective incapacitation. As discussed above, total incapacitation endeavors to eliminate through incarceration those criminal offenders posing any risk to
public safety. 23 9 While selective incapacitation attempts to identify the
few criminal offenders most likely to pose the greatest risk of recidivism,
total incapacitation incarcerates anyone who poses any risk at all. Neorehabilitation, on the other hand, attempts to identify the criminal, but
in this case the end goal is to identify those few low-risk offenders who do
not deserve or require complete elimination from society through incarceration. Like selective incapacitation, neorehabilitation depends on the
ability of advancements in technology to further characterize the criminal, if that is in fact possible. Furthermore, neorehabilitation similarly depends on exclusion of the criminal through total incapacitation. Thus,
selective incapacitation, total incapacitation, and neorehabilitation are
234. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1402 (David Levinson ed., 2002).
235. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 88.
236. Id. ("Selective incapacitation is based on the central insight that a small subset of
repeat offenders is responsible for the majority of crime and that incapacitating that small
group would have exponential benefits for the overall crime rate."); PETER W. GREENWOOD, RAND CORP., SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION, at vii (1982) ("Selective incapacitation
is a strategy that attempts to use objective actuarial evidence to improve the ability of the
current system to identify and confine offenders who represent the most serious risk to the
community."); Note, supra note 233, at 512.
237. HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 89.
238. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 380 (2011) ("A defendant's
record of past criminal conduct is directly relevant to [the four purposes of sentencing]....
To protect the public from further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of
recidivism and future criminal behavior must be considered. Repeated criminal behavior is
an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation. [The criminal history categories] are consistent with the extant empirical research assessing correlates of recidivism
and patterns of career criminal behavior."); see also HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 99-100
("It is important to note that most of the state guidelines and sentencing mechanisms also
use two-dimensional grids that focus primarily on prior criminal history as well as, naturally, the severity of the crime."). But see Reitz, supra note 65, at 1105 (arguing that no
state guidelines system shared the architecture of the federal structure).
239. See discussion supra Part II.
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different theories along the same spectrum of risk aversion and
exclusionism.
Neorehabilitation, through heavy reliance on evidence-based programs
and actuarial tools, finds its roots in a major shift in conceptualizing crime
and the management of crime first identified by Professors Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon. In their article The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Correctionsand Its Implications, the two professors

described a broad shift in criminal justice technique and discourse away
from the "old penology," which focused on moral sensibility, responsibility, individual fault, diagnosis, and intervention, towards a "new penology." 240 The new penology focuses on "techniques to identify, classify,
and manage group[s of criminal offenders] sorted by dangerousness" as
determined by statistical prediction. 241 The basis of the new penology emphasizes managing levels of deviance in a permanent high-risk group,
rather than intervening or responding to individual deviance or social
malformations. 242 In many ways, neorehabilitation captures the shifting
trend that troubled Professors Feeley and Simon. Indeed, their article
speculated that "drug treatment and rehabilitation [would] become increasingly attractive as the cost of long-term custody increase[d]," but it
questioned "whether these innovations [would] embrace the long-term
perspective of earlier successful treatment programs." 243 Ultimately, they
speculated that despite the "lingering language of rehabilitation and reintegration," this new penology would at best manage costs and control
dangerous populations rather than invest in social or personal transformations. 244 Though Professors Feeley and Simon refrained from thinking
of this shift as a theory or program, 245 they recognized its origins in the
shift towards selective incapacitation. 246 This Article identifies the framework that has grown from this new ideology that these scholars first suggested ten years ago. Though neorehabilitation does not suffer from some
of the specific weaknesses Professors Feeley and Simon predicted, 247
their critique illustrates the main shortcoming of neorehabilitation: costefficiency and predictive tools are used to manage prison populations
within the same framework of exclusion captured by the theory of total
incapacitation, even though the new framework uses a rhetoric of
rehabilitation. 248
240. Feeley & Simon, supra note 21, at 452.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 465.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 459-60 (suggesting that someday the new penology may be identified as "a
theory or program conceived in full by any particular actors in the system," but refusing to
interpret the shift in such manner at that juncture because it was only starting to take
shape.).
246. See id. at 458.
247. Feeley and Simon specifically speculated that this new framework would shift focus away from reducing recidivism. Id. at 450. Neorehabilitation focuses very heavily on
reducing recidivism. See supra Part II.
248. See Feely & Simon, supra note 21, at 465.
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Neorehabilitation does not have to continue along the same theoretical
lines of total incapacitation. Rehabilitation theory was once a reintegrationist theory of punishment. 2 49 Prior to the 1970s, the old rehabilitative
model arguably centered on reintroducing and reintegrating prisoners
into the social fabric upon release from prison. 250 And though that theory
had its own weaknesses, the United States existed with a stable rate of
incarceration for the majority of the twentieth century under this
model. 25 1 Neorehabilitation may provide some stability in the prison population, but it will perpetuate a much higher level of incarceration, consistent with the disproportionate level of punitiveness sustained in the
United States since the 1980s. But, to resolve the problem of mass incarceration, states need to do more than simply stabilize their prison populations-they need to decarcerate. 252 Given that the costs of maintaining a
prison, even without increasing the number of prisoners, still continue to
rise each year, states cannot hope to decrease costs without decreasing
prisoners.2 53 This requires reducing both the number of prisoners sent to
prison and the length of prison sentences. 2 54 Neorehabilitation does not
reach this result; thus, it will not lead states away from mass incarceration, regardless of the change in rhetoric.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States finds itself lost in the darkness of mass incarceration,
in search of a theory of reform that will be the key to managing this sociological phenomenon. Hope seems to exist in the theory of neorehabilitation, which is identifiable in various emergency sentencing policy reforms
implemented by states to manage their prison populations in the face of
converging pressures. This hope, however, is false. This Article concludes
that neorehabilitation will not guide states away from the overreliance on
incarceration; rather, the theory maintains the current goal of total inca249. Dolovich, supra note 40, at 291-92.
250. Dolovich recognizes that the pre-1980s concept of rehabilitation was focused on
reinterpretation. Dolovich, supra note 53, at 102. But she also acknowledges that the extent of reintegration on the spectrum from exclusion to reintegration should not be exaggerated. Id. To this end, she recognizes Mona Lynch's influential conclusion that the
rehabilitative model was not a widespread national theory of reform prior to the 1980s but
rather a regional theory of reform most prevalent in the Northeast and Midwest regions of
the United States. See MONA LYNCH, SUNBELT JUSTICE: ARIZONA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 212 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2010). The Sunbelt, according to Lynch, never fully subscribed to this theory of reform. Id. Nevertheless, there was a
general acknowledgement by the 1960s that rehabilitation was a focus of state correctional
facilities because there was some recognition that criminal offenders would at some point
reenter society. Dolovich, supra note 53, at 101.
251. See supra notes 54-56.
252. McLeod, supra note 15, at 1631 ("[Tlhe scholarly consensus suggests that prison
commitments must be reduced and prison release increased and return to prison after parole failure decreased.").
253. Gottschalk, supra note 8, at 67 ("Most prison costs are fixed and are not easily cut.
The only way to substantially reduce spending on corrections is to send fewer people to jail
or prison and shut down penal facilities.").
254. See id.
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pacitation, though in a different rhetorical form. Moreover, it stands to
focus on the wrong offenders, exacerbate racial disparities, and distort
our very perception of justice. The adoption of the neorehabilitative
model as the new framework within which to manage prison populations
is similar to the analogy of the man searching for his keys under the street
lamp far from his car. Rather than using a penal theory that truly differs
from the theory that led us to mass incarceration, neorehabilitation is the
light of what is known. It is not, however, the key to resolving this problem. 2 5 5 As this Article has demonstrated, the new rehabilitative model
fails to move beyond the old incapacitation model. Accordingly, the
problem of mass incarceration remains unscathed, like a car locked in the
darkness.

255. As stated earlier, neorehabilitation alone cannot solve the problem of mass incarceration. The challenge lies in changing the way society thinks about punishment for all
offenders, not just low-level offenders identified as easiest to rehabilitate. Scholars diverge
on possible ways to cabin the punitive appetite of the U.S. public. In future works, I intend
to explore the ways that emergency reforms implemented within the neorehabilitative
framework can transform into long-term policy changes.

